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INTRODUCTION
This Review of Khiara Bridges's compelling book, The Poverty of Privacy
Rights, is published on the fiftieth anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s
death.' In reading his pivotal speeches, sermons, and commentary, we are struck
by his profound wisdom on matters related to race, class, reproductive auton-
omy, health, and women's equality. In 1966, King wrote a landmark speech on
reproductive health and rights for his acceptance of Planned Parenthood's inau-
gural Margaret Sanger Award.2 In accepting his award, King argued that Black
Americans "have no mere academic nor ordinary interest in family planning."'
He explained that while " [t] here is scarcely anything more tragic in human life
than a child who is not wanted," poverty is often at the root of this condition.'
Despite the many "mountainous obstacles" facing the Black community, King
insisted that "one element in stabilizing [the Negro's] life would be an under-
standing of and easy access to the means to develop a family related in size to his
community environment and to the income potential he can command."' Par-
tially due to this reason, King saw the Civil Rights movement and advocacy for
family planning as "natural allies" seeking to "guarantee [] the right to exist in
freedom and dignity."6
1. KHIARAM. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 2-4 (2017).
2. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Family Planning-A Special and Urgent Concern
(May 5, 1966), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-gulf-coast/mlk
-acceptance-speech [http://perma.cc/7TV2-22L5] (delivered by Coretta Scott King). Of Mar-
garet Sanger, King noted that there is a "striking kinship" between the fight for reproductive
rights and civil rights, particularly because " [Sanger], like we, saw the horrifying conditions
of ghetto life." Id. He explained, " [I]ike we, she knew that all of society is poisoned by cancer-
ous slums." Id. King noted that Sanger sought, like he, to expose truth "to the millions." Id.
Recent scholarship provides a nuanced and complicated view of Sanger, who founded what is
now the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. On one hand, she was a courageous ad-
vocate of women's rights and family planning, having been arrested numerous times in her
advocacy to provide poor women access to birth control. Conversely, she is also described as
a sympathizer of U.S. eugenics efforts of the early twentieth century. See, e.g., ADAM COHEN,
IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE
BUCK 56-57 (2016); IRIS LOPEZ, MATTERS OF CHOICE: PUERTO RICAN WOMEN'S STRUGGLE
FOR REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 16-18 (2008). This Review does not unpack that literature.
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King's Planned Parenthood acceptance speech came at a time when some re-
searchers and doctors estimated that as many as one million illegal or "back-al-
ley" abortions took place each year in the United States.7 Hospitals were over-
whelmed by the deaths and infections caused by coat-hanger abortions. Deaths
were most striking among poor women of color: "[m] aternal mortality rates of
black women were three to four times higher than those of white women," and
abortion-related deaths accounted for nearly half of the total maternal mortality
in New York City.10 Hospitals in major cities hosted an alarming number of sur-
vivors: teenagers and women who nearly bled to death or were severely burned
while trying to end unwanted pregnancies." Far less fortunate pregnant women
died on kitchen tables, in bathtubs, and in unsanitary makeshift abortion facili-
ties: closets, bedrooms, and living rooms. During this period, it remained illegal
in a number of states for physicians or anyone else to provide birth control to
unmarried women.12
Family planning then, as well as now, is what King called "a special and ur-
gent concern"" because reproductive autonomy is directly linked to women's
freedom, liberty, dignity, and health.14 We are struck by the dramatic contrasts
between the conversations taking place in the public sphere then and now, and
we are particularly concerned with the continuing threats to poor women's re-
productive health and rights.
For example, decades ago, Prescott Bush, father of former President George
H. W. Bush, served as an early treasurer and fundraiser for Planned
7. Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, 6 GUTTMACHER POL'Y
REv. 8, 8 (2003) ("One analysis, extrapolating from data from North Carolina, concluded that
an estimated 829,000 illegal or self-induced abortions occurred in 1967"); see also LAWRENCE
LADER, ABORTION 2 (1966) ("In 1957 a conference of experts sponsored by the Planned
Parenthood Federation estimated that U.S. abortions could run from 200,000 to 1,200,000
annually.").
8. See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 214 (1997).
9. Id. at 213 ("The racial differences in abortion-related deaths and access to safe therapeutic
abortions mirrored the racial inequities in health services in general and in overall health.").
High maternal mortality rates remain a problem in this country, especially for women of color.
See infra Part III.
1o. REAGAN, supra note 8, at 214.
ii. Id. at 210-11.
12. In Massachusetts, for example, the law provided for a maximum five-year prison term for
those giving away "any drug, medicine, instrument or article" relating to contraception, except
for married individuals. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1972).
13. King, supra note 2.
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Parenthood." Later, then-Congressman George H. W. Bush played a crucial role
in the enactment of Title X, which provides family planning services, including
contraceptives for the poor.16 in 1969, when access to family planning for poor
women was being debated in Congress, George H. W. Bush exclaimed, "We
need to take sensationalism out of this topic so that it can no longer be used by
militants who have no real knowledge of the voluntary nature of the program
but, rather, are using it as a political stepping stone."1 7 According to the former
President, "If family planning is anything, it is a public health matter."" Bush
prevailed, and President Nixon signed Title X legislation into law.
By contrast, in early 2017, a partisan, Republican-led effort in Congress gut-
ted Title X provisions, leaving states free to ban abortion providers from reim-
bursement for basic family planning services, including cervical and breast can-
cer screenings, testing for sexually transmitted diseases, and provisions of
contraception provided to the poor.19 Republican leadership proclaimed it a vic-
tory, and President Trump immediately signed the legislation into law.20 Shortly
thereafter, the House Committee on Appropriations approved the Make America
Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act of 2018, which eliminates nearly three
15. Pema Levy, How the Bush Family Aided Planned Parenthood's Rise, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 11,
2015, lo:oo AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2o15/o8/planned-parenthood-jeb
-bush-wants-roll-back-his-fathers-legacy [http://perma.cc/268E-X8FU].
16. Id.; see also Meredith Shiner, Primer on Title X. The Fund Behind the Planned Parenthood Rider,
POLITICO: ON CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on
-congress/2011/o4/primer-on-title-x-the-fund-behind-the-planned-parenthood-rider
-034864 [http://perma.cc/BVP7-WBT7].
17. Ann Gerhart, Birth Control as Election Issue? Why? (Feb. 20, 2012), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birth-control-as-election-issue-why/2012/o2
/1 7/glQASW6kPR story.html [http://perma.cc/JJ4G-DLLV].
18. Id.
ig. See Colin Dwyer, Trump Signs Law Giving States Option To Deny Funding for Planned
Parenthood, NPR (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017
/04/13/523795052/trump-signs-law-giving-states-option-to-deny-funding-for-planned
-parenthood [http://perma.cc/93SL-CWXJ]; ulie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Signs Law Taking
Aim at Planned Parenthood Funding, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/13/us/politics/planned-parenthood-trump.html [http://perma.cc/3JZ7-Q8XJ]
("Regardless of his misgivings about the effort, Mr. Trump appeared ready to accept congres-
sional Republicans' idea of using a broad health care overhaul to strip all federal money from
Planned Parenthood."); Lisa Lambert, Trump Signs Resolution Allowing U.S. States To Block
Family Planning Funds, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/us-usa-trump-abortion/trump-signs-resolution-allowing-u-s-states-to-block-family
-planning-funds-idUSKBN17F2IH [http://perma.cc/KZV2-VW4T].
20. Lambert, supra note 19.
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hundred million dollars in Title X funding for family planning services, essen-
tially defunding the program.2 1 Consequently, if enacted, this legislation will di-
rectly harm millions of poor Americans, including those who are underinsured
and the low-income insured who access Title X services each year.22
Whether or not the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations
Act of 2018 becomes law, we are deeply concerned about lawmakers' evident dis-
regard for the lives of poor women and the inhumanity that such legislation
seeks to bake into law. Gutting funding for programs that provide essential
health services does not contribute to the prosperity of poor women and girls,
nor does it advance their security.23 instead, stripping funding from this pro-
gram evinces disdain for the poorest American women because in the worst
cases, the results include mass-scale preventable deaths.2 4
21. ANGELA NAPILI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33644, TITLE X (PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT)
FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM 4-7 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33644.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6M9K-KRZ2] (writing that the bill "would provide no funding for the Tide X pro-
gram").
22. Casey Quinlan, House Republicans Want To Kill Funding for Family Planning Services, THINK
PROGRESS (July 25, 2017, 2:52 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/title-x-funding-cob54e2d9a2b
[http://perma.cc/MD7A-7L7P]; see also NAPILI, supra note 21, at 5 ("The House-reported
FY2o18 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill, H.R. 3358, would provide no funding for
the Title X program in FY2ol8.").
23. To the contrary, empirical research shows that when facilities that provide Title X health ser-
vices close, the rates of unintended pregnancies and Medicaid-funded births increase. This
evidence also dispels the notion that policies to eliminate or reduce Title X funding promote
or enhance the government's fiscal security. See, e.g., State Facts About Unintended Pregnancy:
Texas, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2017), http://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts
-about-unintended-pregnancy-texas [http://perma.cc/5DS3-EDN8] ("Unintended pr g-
nancies are also costly to the federal and state governments, resulting in $21.0 billion in public
expenditures in 2010. Yet, these costs could have been considerably higher: By helping women
avoid unintended pregnancies, publicly funded family planning services saved taxpayers $13.6
billion in 2010, or $7.09 for every $1 spent." (footnote omitted)); see also Amanda J. Stevenson
et al., Effect of Removal of Planned Parenthood from the Texas Women's Health Program, 374 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 853, 853 (2016) (noting that during the period in which researchers tudied the
closure of facilities providing Title X services in Texas, "the rate of childbirth covered by Med-
icaid increased by 1.9 percentage points (a relative increase of 27.1% from baseline) within 18
months after the claim"); Deborah Netburn, After Texas Stopped Funding Planned Parenthood,
Low-Income Women Had More Babies, L.A. TIMEs (Feb. 3, 2016,4:01 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-planned-parenthood-texas-births-2o1602o3-story.htm
[http://perma.cc/FHU5-98BP].
24. Marian F. MacDorman et al., Recent Increases in the U.S. Maternal Mortality Rate: Disentangling
Trends from Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 447 (2016); Sophie Novack,
Texas' Maternal Mortality Rate: Worst in Developed World, Shrugged OffBy Lawmakers, TEX.
OBSERVER (June 5, 2017, 6:04 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-worst-maternal
-mortality-rate-developed-world-lawmakers-priorities [http://perma.cc/T2ZB-99YN].
1275
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Consider the case of Texas, where lawmakers gutted Title X funding and
caused reproductive health clinics to close. Three serious problems emerged.
First, there was a reduction in access to, prescribing of, and use of long-acting
contraception.2 5 Second, more Medicaid-eligible pregnancies occurred.2 6 And,
third, the rate of maternal mortality skyrocketed.2 7 The state's efforts to repeal
and curtail reproductive rights and to close the clinics that provided reproductive
health services seem likely to correlate to the problems identified above. The dra-
matic rise in maternal mortality in Texas now earns it the reputation as "one of
the most dangerous places in the developed world to have a baby."28
In our view, efforts to gut Title X fit a broader pattern of hostility toward the
interests and autonomy of poor women.2 9 In 2015, Title X served over four mil-
lion clients.o Of these clients, 66% had "incomes at or below the federal poverty
guidelines."" According to a 2015 study, 86% of Title X clients had "incomes at
or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines."3 2 For the majority of Title X
patients, the Title X clinics that service them are their "usual" or only healthcare
provider." The question is not: if Congress eliminates Title X funding, where
will poor women be served? Rather, we must ask whether they will have any
healthcare access at all, given that Title X barely serves the millions of poor
women and girls in dire need of reproductive health services. Eliminating what
little remains of the program further lowers the benchmark of cruel and unjust
treatment toward poor women.
The scale and scope of contemporary efforts to hollow out privacy rights and
render them meaningless for poor women extend well beyond Title X.34 In this
25. Stevenson et al., supra note 23.
26. Id.; see also Netburn, supra note 23 (summarizing the findings of Stevenson's study).
27. MacDorman et al., supra note 24.
28. Nina Martin, Texas Is One of the Most Dangerous Places in The Developed World To Have a
Baby, PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 1, 2016), http://psmag.com/news/texas-is-one-of-the-most
-dangerous-places-in-the-developed-world-to-have-a-baby [http://perma.cc/MCP7
-Y7YW].
29. The number of clients served by Title X has steadily declined. In 2015, 23% fewer people were
served by the program than in 2010. Reduced revenues for family planning services, staffing
shortages, and increasing costs for providing services all account for some of the decrease in





34. See generally LAURA E. G6MEz, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND
THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG ExPosuRE (1997) (analyzing the state's intrusion into the
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Review, we argue that state legislatures, as well as the federal government and
courts, express moral disregard and even outright contempt for poor women in
multitudinous ways that include, but extend beyond, Bridges's daring new
book." The Poverty of Privacy Rights argues that states' moral constructions of
poverty, which frame indigent women as lazy, irresponsible, and ultimately im-
moral, help justify unwelcome state interventions in these women's lives, as well
as the deprivation of their privacy rights. However, we emphasize the point that
it is the state that bears the mark of immorality and illegitimacy when it deprives
women of civil liberties and constitutional rights. For example, in Alabama,
where King famously penned Letterfrom a BirminghamJail,3 6 nearly five hundred
poor women have been prosecuted in recent years for endangering their fe-
tuses.7 In most of those cases, medical providers also played a key role in dis-
lives of mothers who gave birth to drug-addicted babies in the 198os and 90s); April L.
Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women for the Benefit of Fetal
Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 148 (2007) (describing how states justified interven-
tions in women's pregnancies based on the notion that women harbored "maternal environ-
ments" that threatened fetal health); Michelle Goldberg, Policing Pregnancy, NATION
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/160092/policing-pregnancy [http://
perma.cc/28A3-DJBX] (describing the erosion of abortion rights and consequent rise in feti-
cide laws). Twenty-five years ago, Dorothy Roberts exposed how racial animus toward poor
Black mothers resulted in criminal and civil punishments. Her chilling descriptions of gov-
ernment interventions and harassment of poor Black mothers exposed how race was and con-
tinues to be an intrinsic factor in the hierarchy of reproductive rights. See, e.g., Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
3s. One key vehicle for this disregard for poor women is fetal protection laws, which on their face
apply equally to all women (and men), but in practice almost exclusively target poor women
for threatening the health of their fetuses. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws:
Moral Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 781 (2014) (analyzing the
myriad ways in which states problematically and unconstitutionally intervene in vulnerable
women's pregnancies, ranging from pregnancy exclusion laws that override pregnant
women's medical directives, to laws that punish women for endangering their fetuses); Lynn
M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United
States, 1973-2oo5: Implications for Women's Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 299, 300 (2013) (empirically cataloguing the hundreds of instances in which poor
pregnant women were targeted for criminal punishment).
36. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail [King, Jr.], U. PA. (Apr. 16, 1963),
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles-Gen/Letter Birmingham.html [http://perma.cc
/AR7A- 5U3Z].
37. Nina Martin, The State that Turns Pregnant Women into Felons, ALTERNET (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:24
AM GMT), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/when-womb-crime-scene [http://perma.cc
/8S8N-W2DG]; see also Exparte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 429 (Ala. 2013) (Parker, J., concur-
ring) (upholding the conviction of a poor mother for "endangering" her fetus, opining, "The
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closing confidential patient information and reporting the women to law en-
forcement." Such actions, combined with recent federal and state efforts to un-
dermine women's reproductive healthcare rights through the enactment of tar-
geted regulations of abortion providers" (known as "TRAP" laws), the
exclusion of Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers from Title X pro-
grams,4 0 and efforts to repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's
reproductive health safeguards,4 1 demonstrate remarkable disdain for the lives
and dignity of poor women.
We think King would be horrified by the state's oversized role in determining
how and when women can control their reproductive health. Both King and
Bridges explicate the urgency and necessity of paying close attention to the dig-
nity of poor women, especially poor women of color. They agree that profound
cruelty and indignity define the stigmatization of poor mothers. Indeed, one of
the key contributions of Bridges's book is its careful analysis of how such stig-
matization not only affects how society treats poor mothers, but also how it
structures the law's treatment of these women.4 2 Bridges provides a number of
analytical frameworks that illuminate the social and legal ways in which poor
women's reproductive rights are rendered ineffective or nugatory.
This Review problematizes the intersection of privacy and morality. We ar-
gue not only that the state is a fallible and problematic arbiter of women's mo-
rality, but also that it acts immorally when it deprives poor women of privacy,
compromises their bodily autonomy, and threatens to rob them of life itself.
Bounded in the state's immoral actions toward poor women of color are its his-
torical struggles and campaigns against their personhood and citizenship,43 as
decision of this Court today is in keeping with the widespread legal recognition that unborn
children are persons with rights that should be protected by law").
38. Martin, supra note 37.
39. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers [http://perma
.cc/EVF2-METV].
40. Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Lets States Defund Clinics That Perform Abortions, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/politics/pence-congress-family
-planning-money.html [http://perma.cc/CL4F-ZRXD].
41. Alanna Vagianos, Kirsten Gillibrand: If You Love Women, Do Not Unwind the Affordable Care
Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/kirsten-gillibrand-if-you-love-women-do-not-unwind-the-affordable-care-act us_5877e6
a9e4bob3c7a7bo544d [http://perma.cc/V38Y-2CPD].
42. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 2-4.
43. The case of American antebellum slavery illustrates our point. In the context of slavery, the
moral construction of poverty rendered Black women's bodies as property, which could be
bartered, rented, leased, and sold. Later, during Jim Crow, this construction morphed into a
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well as conscription of their bodies in service to malevolent state agendas such
as eugenics and forced sterilization.4 4 This is more than mere indifference, but
an historic pattern. In this Review, we illustrate how the continued effects of
more than a century of negative state interventions in the reproductive lives of
poor women of color are actually deadly.
In addition, we predict that the continued interference in the reproductive
lives of poor women creates cultural norms and precedents in medicine, society,
law enforcement, legislatures, and courts that will spill over and constrain the
rights of all classes of women, regardless of race. That is, historical disregard for
the lives and rights of Black women inscribed by judicial doctrine and court
opinions, as well as state and federal legislation, enable ongoing and future dis-
paragement of all women.
In this Review, we argue that the core bundle of rights contained in repro-
ductive privacy has been hollowed out through new legislation and court deci-
sions, affecting the actual practice of reproductive privacy.45 We show how in-
creasingly, even judicial opinions affirming reproductive rights fail to constrain
strong eugenics discourse to eliminate the possibility of Black women giving birth to future
citizens. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. 393, 404 (1857) ("We think ... that they are
not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Consti-
tution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument pro-
vides for and secures to citizens of the United States."). In the immigration context, the moral
construction of poverty rendered and stereotyped Chinese women as prostitutes unworthy of
citizenship, an attitude enacted into law. See, e.g., Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, § 3, 18 Stat. 477
(repealed 1974) (prohibiting "the importation into the United States of women for the pur-
poses of prostitution," contemplating women from Asia); see also Kerry Abrams, Polygamy,
Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 1o5 COLUM. L. REv. 641, 643, 698-99
(2005) (arguing that the Page Act was part of a broader effort to ban all Chinese women from
the United States and noting that " [i] f a woman answered 'single' or if her aspired occupation
seemed improbable, the consul could conclude that she was a likely prostitute").
44. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the forced sterilization of the so-called men-
tally unfit under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
45. For example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was a significant retreat from
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), stripping the abortion right of its fundamental contours and
imposing paternalistic standards that actually do not advance women's health. See also Rust v.
Sullivan, soo U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding restrictions and conditions on Title X funding);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) ("[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's free-
dom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail
herself of the full range of protected choices."); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977) (" [W]e
do not agree that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage is unrea-
sonable under Title XIX."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (ruling that Roe v. Wade
"implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.... An in-
digent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connect-
icut's decision to fund childbirth").
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state governments seeking to eviscerate those rights through new legislation.4 6
Though court rulings recognize these rights, they ultimately render them mean-
ingless for poor women, particularly poor women of color. Since these groups
are largely unseen and unheard by those who make the law and policy, they are
the first victims. As the policies that substantially burden women's reproductive
rights become normalized, these norms will affect broader segments of the pop-
ulation, placing greater numbers of women at risk.
We view these issues as not simply matters of law, but of human rights, mo-
rality, and dignity. The moral hypocrisy of the state is clear in the reproductive
health context. When the state coerces women and girls into pregnancies they
do not want and to bear children they do not desire to have, it not only creates
unconstitutional conditions, as Bridges argues, but it also acts immorally. Even
though legal scholars typically refer to lawmaking that unduly burdens the poor
as unjust, we suggest hat legislative efforts to eviscerate reproductive rights are
far worse than that.
Part I of this Review provides a descriptive account of Bridges's work by
highlighting the key analytical tools used to build her argument. We further
show how the interceding forces of racism, classism, and sexism result in the
legal construction of privacy rights that are too weak to stop government in-
fringement. Part II expands beyond Bridges's historical arguments to demon-
strate the ongoing and essential role played by the moral construct of poverty in
the state's intervention in poor women's reproductive lives. This Part also ex-
plores the broader implications of reproductive privacy in the abortion context,
arguing that TRAP laws wield the potential to spread the rosion of reproductive
privacy. Finally, Part III issues a warning call, highlighting how the trampling of
reproductive privacy rights not only disenfranchises the poor of these rights, but
also may potentially render all women's reproductive privacy rights ineffective.
The moral and legal arguments adopted by courts and legislatures to disenfran-
chise poor women of their privacy rights are quickly being used to limit all
46. In the wake of Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), which many cele-
brate as a reproductive rights victory, state legislatures began vetting laws nearly identical to
the Texas laws struck down by the Court. In Minnesota, legislators proposed bills - ultimately
vetoed by the Governor- shortly after Whole Woman's Health that closely resemble the ambu-
latory surgical center requirements ruled unconstitutional by the Court. See, e.g., S.F. 704,
2017 Leg., 9oth Sess. (Minn. 2017) (prohibiting establishment of abortion facilities without a
license); S.F. 702, 2017 Leg., 9oth Sess. (Minn. 2017) (prohibiting use of state-sponsored
health programs for funding abortions).
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women's reproductive rights. Once again, those who are most vulnerable are the
canaries in the coal mine for us all.47
I. RACE, CLASS, AND THE LOSS OF FAMILY AND REPRODUCTIVE
PRIVACY
Bridges articulates an alarming thesis in The Poverty of Privacy Rights: simply
put, poor women have no privacy rights. She theorizes that these women are
deprived of privacy rights because society presumes that they do not "possess the
character that justifies recognizing the[se] rights in the first instance."48 The
book emphasizes reproductive, family, and informational privacy rights - areas
that are thought to protect the privacy of poor mothers but which instead fall
victim to heavy state regulation.49 Her work helps us to understand how poor
women are burdened even in states like New York, which have otherwise favor-
able laws on the books.o For example, one New York woman, Erika Christen-
sen, could not get a medically necessary abortion at around week thirty, which
was past the legal cutoff in the state. As she recounted to the New York Civil
Liberties Union (NYCLU), "We live in New York, after all and my baby is not
viable. Yet, I still can't have this done in a supposedly progressive state."" Get-
ting this late-term abortion cost Christensen $25,000, not including travel and
47. Julie D. Cantor, Court-Ordered Care: A Complication of Pregnancy To Avoid, 366 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 2237, 2240 (2012) (arguing that judicial interventions in pregnancies "betray founda-
tional legal principles of our free society" and "endanger the liberty of us all").
48. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 34.
49. Id.
5o. For example, despite the fact that New York was one of the first states to legalize abortion,
some "New York women ... were unable to receive constitutionally protected care because of
the state's outmoded abortion law." KATHARINE BODDE & SEBASTIAN KRUEGER, N.Y. CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES UNION, CRITICAL CONDITIONS: How NEW YORK'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL ABORTION
LAWJEOPARDIZES WOMEN's HEALTH 6 (2017), http://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field
documents/nyclu criicalcondiions_2o170126.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZSKJ-SGDJ]. New
York "criminalizes abortion after 24 weeks unless it is needed to save a woman's life." Id. at 5.
The law, which was enacted three years before Roe v. Wade, remains unchanged since that
time. Id.; see also JORDAN GOLDBERG ET AL., NAT'L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, WHEN SELF-
ABORTION IS A CRIME: LAWS THAT PUT WOMEN AT RISK 1 (2017), http://www
.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2o17/o6/Self-Abortion-White-Paper-Final.pdf [http://
perma.cc 3Q62-QAN9] ("Now, even as women may be able to self-induce an abortion with-
out attendant hazards to their health, they may face another serious complication: prosecution
and incarceration. In a few states, including New York, inducing an abortion on oneself re-
mains a crime.").
51. BODDE & ICRUEGER, supra note So, at 17.
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hotel.52 As she pointed out, "That would be impossible for most people. They
would have to carry to term because they can't afford it."s"
Sadly, very often poor women are not lucky enough to be able to spend
thousands of dollars and fly to another state to obtain an abortion.54 The
NYCLU report chronicled other such stories of girls and women in New York
forced to carry pregnancies to term even while suffering from cancer or other
serious medical illnesses, or after sexual assault."
The story above conveys two important messages. First, the deprivations of
reproductive rights extend beyond poor women, even in New York. Second, and
perhaps more disturbing, women risk their reproductive rights being denied,
even in matters of life and death, including in states described as "liberal." If this
can happen to wealthier women in liberal states, what are the "on the ground"
realities for poor women's reproductive healthcare rights in any state? Bridges
elegantly answers this question.
The Poverty of Privacy Rights was born out of eighteen months of embedded
field research at a New York City medical center that provides care to women
living in poverty. Bridges's impressive fieldwork involved conducting more than
120 hours of qualitative interviews with indigent pregnant women, observing
their visits with medical providers, and interviewing staff.56 She thoughtfully
expands feminist legal discourse about law, reproductive health, and poverty in
discussing glaring breaches of patient privacy in the civil setting.
52. Id.
53- Id-
54. See id. at 18, 20 (describing one woman who decided to terminate a pregnancy before getting
final results regarding the fetus's abnormalities because she could not afford to travel to an-
other state after New York's twenty-four-week deadline, and another woman in New York
who was forced to carry a fetus that would not survive to term because she could not afford
to travel to obtain an abortion).
55. See, e.g., id. at 5, 16.
56. For a broader reading of Bridges's scholarship related to her field research, see Khiara M.
Bridges, Pregnancy, Medicaid, State Regulation, and the Production of Unruly Bodies, 3 Nw. J.L.
& Soc. POL'Y 62 (2008), which examines the patient enrollment process in the New York State
Prenatal Care Assistance Program, a Medicaid program that underwrites prenatal care for
poor women; Khiara M. Bridges, Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives
of Poor Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 609 (2009), which
analyzes and compares the experiences of poor pregnant women of color at Alpha Hospital to
the experience of the colonized; and Khiara M. Bridges, Wily Patients, Welfare Queens, and the
Reiteration of Race in the U.S., 17 TEx. J. WOMEN &L. 1 (2007), which examines the racialized
constructions and stereotypes that attend receiving state benefits.
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In her first book, Reproducing Race," Bridges's firsthand observations
brought greater clarity and empirical support to prior research showing that
poor patients of color receive "less" quality care or fewer referrals for diagnostic
care services." Her empirical work buttressed long-held suspicions and anecdo-
tal reports that poor Black women are often subjected to hostile treatment in
medical settings, with a focus on public hospitals, such as lengthy delays as well
as constraints on their privacy. Bridges contrasted the experiences of the poor
women of color she observed with her studies of patient care received by wealth-
ier women at a nearby private hospital." These findings were original, insight-
ful, and disturbing, and led to Bridges's conclusion that if privacy were mapped
on a spectrum, those with "no privacy rights" at all were poor mothers.6 0
This Part provides an overview of Bridges's arguments in her new book,
highlighting her analytical moves in order to show how many of the privacy
rights that we assume women legally possess have little effect in poor women's
lives. Bridges believes that law is first and foremost shaped by cultural beliefs
and that it is a mistake to simply rely on the judicial branch to fix how these
beliefs influence law.61 Of particular concern is society's belief in the moral failure
of the poor. In Section I.A, we briefly compare Bridges's "moderate claim" that
poor women have ineffective privacy rights with her "strong claim" that poor
women are completely disenfranchised of privacy rights. In Section I.B, we out-
line the value of privacy rights and how they have been denied to poor women.
In Section I.C, we demonstrate how the state has adopted a moral construction
of motherhood to ultimately blame poor women for their poverty, and thus jus-
tify invasions of their privacy rights.
57. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RA-
CIALIZATION (2011).
58. See, e.g., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH
CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al eds., 2003); Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Black-White
Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990); Carmen R. Green et al., The UnequalBurden
of Pain: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277 (2003); Vickie L.
Shavers et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Among the U.S. Adult Population, 21 J. HEALTH CARE
POOR & UNDERSERVED 177 (2010); Michelle van Ryn & Steven S. Fu, Paved with Good Inten-
tions: Do Public Health and Human Service Providers Contribute to Racial/Ethnic Disparities in
Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 248 (2003).
59. BRIDGES, supra note 57, at 15.
6o. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 11.
61. Khiara Bridges, Concluding Remarks at the Boston University School of Law's Symposium
on The Poverty ofPrivacy Rights (Nov. 20, 2017) (transcript on file with authors).
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A. Depriving Poor Mothers of Privacy Rights
Bridges's book frames a nuanced argument about privacy that encapsulates
dignity and takes seriously the experiences of vulnerable women across the do-
mains of family, reproduction, and informational privacy. Bridges encourages a
deeper scrutiny of law in action - that is, one that probes beyond whether textual
rights exist.62 The key question is whether the promised rights of freedom,
equality, voting, or reproductive health care are tangibly existent for the most
vulnerable in society.
Bridges dissects and then parses her thesis into a "moderate" claim and a
"strong" claim. Bridges's strong claim is that poor women have been informally
disenfranchised of their privacy rights.63 That is, they do not bear these rights at
all. Bridges believes that wealth is a legal prerequisite for privacy rights, relegat-
ing poor women to a similar status as other groups that have been deprived
rights by courts and legislatures.64 Her moderate claim is rooted in a law and
society framework: "for all practical purposes," she writes, poor women have no
privacy rights, in other words, "no effective privacy rights."65 To this end, Bridges
argues that the idea of privacy rings hollow for women who encounter the re-
productive health setting as a threatening, hostile, and, ironically, unsafe envi-
ronment.
An example that fits her moderate claim may be instructive. On September
3, 2015, Blanca Borrego, a forty-four-year-old mother of three, was arrested in
front of her eight-year-old daughter, other patients, and medical staff during a
routine medical checkup at her gynecologist's office. For nearly eighteen months,
she had been treated by the same doctor for an excruciatingly painful, chronic
abdominal cyst. Unlike her usual visits, this time Borrego was scheduled to see
62. Similarly, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in writings subsequent to the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, spoke to the impasse of enforcement and full ac-
tualization of "Negro" rights. King observed, "The short era of widespread goodwill evapo-
rated rapidly. As elation and expectations died, Negroes became more sharply aware that the
goal of freedom was still distant and our immediate plight was substantially still an agony of
deprivation." MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 6 (1967).
63. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 11.
64. Id. at 12-13. Bridges compares poor mothers disenfranchised of privacy rights to Blacks living
under Dred Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and the LGBT community prior to
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
65. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at II.
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her doctor at a different location, the Memorial Hermann Medical Group North-
east Women's Healthcare Clinic outside of Houston, Texas.66 There, after pre-
senting her private medical insurance card (provided through her husband's em-
ployer),67 she was asked to complete new paperwork.
Unbeknownst to Borrego, her doctor's appointment was transformed into
an immigration dragnet, created by her medical providers who prioritized crim-
inal law goals that target undocumented immigrants over medical objectives.
That is, medical staff at the clinic reported Borrego's fake license to law enforce-
ment and secretly admitted the officers into the clinic through a backdoor. In
terrible pain, Borrego waited two hours while staff deceived her that a doctor
would be available. Sadly, the doctor never arrived to care for her. Instead, when
finally taken to the examination room, Borrego was confronted by sheriff's dep-
uties, arrested, taken to jail, and "held in lieu of $35,000 bond."6 8
The attorney for Borrego told reporters that clinic staff violated her client's
privacy and trust, stating " [t] hey took her into that examination room solely for
the purpose of being arrested."6 9 Borrego was not receiving public aid and had a
well-established physician-patient relationship with her doctor.70 However, it
seems that none of that mattered.
Borrego's story exemplifies how rights can lose all meaning and value if they
are not enforced in practice. Cases like this demonstrate what Bridges refers to
as the "impotence of the privacy rights that they do indeed possess."7 1 Although
doctor-patient privacy and medical privacy laws should have protected Borrego,
her rights were so weak that they were easily rendered ineffective.
Other recent examples of this phenomenon exist, especially in immigrants'
rights contexts. The Office of Refugee Resettlement has taken aggressive steps
to interfere in the unintended and unwanted pregnancies of migrant girls who
have taken perilous steps to migrate to the United States. In one instance, the
66. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Advocates Protest Latina Immigrant's Arrest at Texas Doctor's Office, L.A.
TIMEs (Sept. 15, 2015, 5:39 PM), http://www.atimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-houston
-immigrant-clinic-arrest-20150914-story.html [http://perma.cc/6V7N-G4471.
67. Unlike millions of women, Ms. Borrego had the luxury of private medical insurance, which
medical offices prefer, because the payments are direct from the provider and incur less bu-
reaucracy than state-funded health plans like Medicaid and Medicare.
68. Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 66. Prosecutors charged her with "tampering with a government
record" by producing fake identification, which is a felony. Id.
69. Michael Barajas, Woman Arrested at Gynecologist Appointment Could Face Deportation, Hous.
PREss (Sept. 11, 2015, 8:oo AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/woman-arrested-at
-gynecologist-appointment-could-face-deportation-7754827 [http://perma.cc/4JZT-47EK].
70. Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 66.
71. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at II.
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former head of the agency, Ken Tota, contacted a shelter and ordered officials to
take a girl against her will to a hospital to reverse her medical abortion- and if
that did not work, to deny her the second pill to complete the uterus evacua-
tion,72 which can be dangerous "because a woman can become septic from left-
over tissue in her uterus."" In a memorandum sent to the shelter, Tota instructed
the shelter to essentially force the girl to have a gynecological examination- and
the shelter complied.74
Our illustration of Bridges's moderate claim with respect to the plight of
Borrego and that of detained girls emphasizes the ways in which medical profes-
sionals and others conspire with the state in its agenda to suppress the autonomy
and privacy of poor women of color. In other words, these cases do not happen
in a vacuum, but are facilitated through third parties. Prior work examines how
this form of complicit bias -third parties conspiring to reframe, deny or sup-
press rights - stultifies reproductive rights.
Bridges might distinguish her strong claim (described further below) from
Borrego's story by pointing out that the disenfranchisement of poor mothers of
their rights does not always happen through noncompliance with the law. 76
ther, the denial of privacy can occur through the legislative process, where law-
makers deny rights and isparately impose conditions on vulnerable groups, and
72. Michelle Goldberg, The Trump Administration's Power Over a Pregnant Girl, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/opinion/trump-pregnancy-abortion-.html
[http://perma.cc/3XTP-UKCU8].
73. See Ashley Lopez, What Stood Between an Undocumented Minor and an Abortion? One Trump




74. See id. In a memorandum written by Tota, he directed:
This memorandum directs [the Office of Refugee Resettlement] to bring the UAC
[Unaccompanied Alien Child] to the emergency room of a local hospital in order
to determine the health status of the UAC and her unborn child. If steps can be
taken to preserve the life of the UAC and her unborn child, those steps should be
taken. If it is confirmed that the unborn child has already expired due to the begin-
ning of the abortion procedure, steps can be taken to safely remove the body of the
unborn child.
Id.
75. Goodwin, supra note 35, at 789-90, 792-812 (providing multiple examples from recent crimi-
nal law cases of medical providers revealing private, confidential pregnant patients' medical
information to law enforcement).
76. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 13-14; see also infra Section I.C.
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through legal cases, where the Supreme Court fails to uphold the rights of vul-
nerable individuals and groups. In these cases, mothers have no privacy rights at
all.
Bridges identifies the Supreme Court as one of the chief forces in denying
poor women privacy rights." She suggests that the Court has pulled the wool
over our eyes. For example, people may believe all women possess privacy rights
and even point to cases where that seems apparent, such as Roe v. Wade." But in
reality, she argues, that case does not apply to poor women. For example, in Har-
ris v. McRae, the Court held that "although government may not place obstacles
in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation" by permitting women to use Medicaid to fund
abortions." Her strong claim, she argues, is necessary to combat the legal "soph-
istry" that restrictions on federal funding do not burden the woman's right and
therefore leave Roe v. Wade and the Constitution "not at all disturbed."so
Bridges believes that when poor women have no reasonable means of actu-
alizing their privacy rights, that itself demonstrates that they have no privacy
rights. Abortion cases, as discussed later in this Review, bear this out. However,
Bridges does not limit her discussion to abortion. For example, if the state con-
ditions a poor woman's privacy rights on being surveilled at home (whether she
consents or not), surrendering First Amendment protections, or disclosure of
intimate personal and sexual histories, the state demonstrates that she has no
privacy by its very imposition and enforcement of such norms."
So, what distinguishes Bridges's moderate claim from her strong claim?
Garza v. Hargan82 may be instructive. This case demonstrates the way in which
both the state and federal government may impose policies and practices that
render reproductive rights nonexistent. In October 2017, Jane Doe, a seventeen-
year-old immigrant girl, who traveled hundreds, if not thousands, of miles to
flee physical abuse in her home and country, arrived in the United States where
she was placed in federal detention. This journey alone exposed her to an inor-
dinate risk of sexual abuse, rape, physical abuse, and sexual exploitation "at the
77. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 25-27.
78. Id. at 15.
79. 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
So. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 182-84.
81. See id. at 75-79.
82. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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hands of other migrants, smugglers, and government officials in every country
whose territory she crossed.""
After entering the United States, Doe discovered that she was pregnant and
sought an abortion to terminate the pregnancy.84 Even though she was penni-
less, living without her parents, and residing in a government-funded shelter in
Texas, Doe too possessed constitutional rights. The Fifth Amendment protected
her right to "decide whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy."" However,
Texas law requires that minors either obtain parental approval to terminate a
pregnancy or obtain a judicial waiver.8 6 In this case, Doe obtained the necessary
waiver, which established that she was sufficiently mature to determine whether
or not she wished to end the unwanted pregnancy.
Texas also imposes other conditions on a woman or minor who seeks to end
a pregnancy, namely mandating that she visit a crisis pregnancy center (CPC).
Doe was taken to a religiously affiliated CPC in Texas where she was counseled
to continue her pregnancy." After counseling, Doe reconfirmed the desire to end
83. Order Attaching Statement of Circuit Judge Millett Dissenting from the Disposition of the
Case at 2, Garza, 874 F.3d 735 (No. 17-5236), http://www.acludc.org/sites/default/files/field
-documents/garza v hargan-appeals ctmillettdissent_10-20-2017.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6DXA-YNQG]. According to Amnesty International, "It is a widely held view- shared by
local and international NGOs and health professionals working with migrant women - that
as many as six in 10 migrant women and girls are raped." INVISIBLE VICTIMS: MIGRANTS ON
THE MOVE IN MEXICO 15, AMNESTY INT'L (2010), http://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content
/uploads/2o17/o4/amr4lol420loeng.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6WF-DWAG]; see also id. (not-
ing that rapes are so common that some smugglers require that women "have a contraceptive
injection prior to the journey as a precaution against pregnancy resulting from rape").
84. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Her Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4-5, Garza v. Hargan, No. 1:17-cV-02122 (D.D.C.
Oct. 13, 2017).
85. Garza, 874 F.3d at 737 (Millett, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 739-40.
87. Research shows that such centers are notorious for pressuring women to continue their preg-
nancies. See Jenny Kutner, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers Are Using Taxpayer Dollars To Lie
to Women, SALON (July 14, 2015, 1:41 PM), http://www.salon.com/2o15/o7/14/how
-crisispregnancy centers-are-using taxpayer dollars to lie to women [http://perma
.cc/CAM3-LF 7P] ("More often than not, CPCs -which now outnumber abortion clinics by
an estimated 3 to 1 - can be misleading, manipulative or downright coercive, pushing a dis-
tinctly antiabortion agenda that relies heavily on lying to clients."); see also As Texas Cuts Fam-
ily-Planning Funding, More Goes to Crisis-Pregnancy Services, AM. INDEP. INST., http://www
.americanindependent.com/193545/as-texas- cuts-family-planning-funding-more-goes-to
-crisis-pregnancy-services [http://perma.cc/8JJ8-VU78] ("Ever since Texas CPCs began re-
ceiving public money, reproductive-rights advocates in the state have been noticing a pattern:
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her pregnancy." Texas law also required that Doe undergo a sonogram, where
the doctor is forced to describe the sonogram results, display images, and make
the fetal heartbeat audible to the patient." Again, after this procedure Doe re-
confirmed her decision to end the pregnancy.o
Even after enduring such state-mandated hurdles, Doe was subject to federal
government intrusions on her autonomy rights. To its credit, the government
never maintained that Doe lacked a constitutional right to terminate a preg-
nancy. Rather, it interposed barriers that defied controlling Supreme Court prec-
edent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey" and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt.92
For example, the federal government informed Doe that if she left the shelter to
obtain an abortion, she risked being expelled from the United States and relin-
quishing any legal rights to stay in the United States." To avoid this outcome,
she could find herself a "sponsor," essentially foster parents who would agree to
take custody of her; this alone delayed the abortion by many weeks.94 The federal
88. Jackie Wang, Unauthorized Immigrant Minor 'Jane Doe" Has Abortion After Back-and-Forth
Court Battle, DALLAS NEws (Oct. 25, 2017, 2 :17 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business
/health-care/2017/10/25/undocumented-teen-texas-abortion [http://perma.cc/QKV14
-3TC 5].
89. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.011 (West 2018). In a lower court challenge to the
2012 law, District Court Judge Sparks wrote, "The concept that the government may make
puppets out of doctors, provided it does not step on their patients' rights, is not one this Court
believes is consistent with the Constitution, in the abortion context or otherwise." Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). Despite drafting an opinion sympathetic to the plaintiffs, however,
Judge Sparks ultimately upheld the law, as the Fifth Circuit had tied the lower court's hands
and "left little room for meaningful discussion." Id. at *1; see also Jordan Smith, Ultrasound
Suit Loses Ground, AUSTIN CHRON. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.austinchronicle.com
/news/2012- 02-17/ultrasound-suit-loses- ground [http://perma.cc/TE85-RAVQ] ("The law,
passed this spring after Gov. Rick Perry deemed it an 'emergency' to do so, requires women
seeking abortion to first undergo an ultrasound a day before the termination. It also requires
that women view an image of the fetus and listen to the fetal heartbeat, and that doctors de-
scribe the fetal development."); "We Have No Choice": A Story of the Texas Sonogram Law, NPR
(Jan. 22, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2o13/01/22/169059701/we-have-no-choice-a
-story-of-the-texas-sonogram-law [http://perma.cc/84YA-PPY5].
go. Goldberg, supra note 72.
91. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
92. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
93. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737, 74o, 74o n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Millett, J., concur-
ring).
94. Order Attaching Statement of Circuit Judge Millett Dissenting from the Disposition of the
Case, supra note 83, at 2 ("Forcing her to continue an unwanted pregnancy just in the hopes
of finding a sponsor that has not been found in the past six weeks sacrifices J.D.'s constitu-
tional liberty, autonomy, and personal dignity for no justifiable governmental reason.").
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government claimed that it was not an undue burden on Doe - an impoverished,
pregnant, immigrant minor residing in a shelter in a foreign land- to search for
weeks for a sponsor as a condition for having an abortion without risking depor-
tation. A seven-week waiting period for an abortion is clearly unconstitutional.
Tellingly, the government appointed a guardian ad litem for Doe but refused
to release her to the custody of the guardian in order to obtain the abortion. The
Trump Administration blocked the minor's transportation to a clinic, claiming
that even allowing a government contractor to facilitate the necessary paperwork
for Doe's release would place a burden on the government." Essentially, then,
the federal government determined the only option for Doe was to continue the
pregnancy. The teenager finally prevailed when her petition reached the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals and the court issued an en banc order securing her right
to terminate the pregnancy.96
In a stinging concurring opinion, Judge Millett wrote, "Where the govern-
ment bulldozed over constitutional lines was its position that- accepting J.D.'s
constitutional right and accepting her full compliance with Texas law-J.D., an
unaccompanied child, has the burden of extracting herselffrom custody if she wants
to exercise the right to an abortion that the government does not dispute she
has."97
95. Garza, 874 F.3d at 740-41 (Millett, J., concurring) ("The government argues that it need not
'facilitate' J.D.'s decision to terminate her pregnancy.... Government officials themselves do
not even have to do any paperwork or undertake any other administrative measures.... So
on the record of this case, the government does not have to facilitate -make easier-J.D.'s
termination of her pregnancy. It just has to not interfere or make things harder."). Many in the
public confused the case, believing that taxpayers were being asked to bear the financial cost
of the abortion -and that the government refused to pay. See Linda Greenhouse, The Worri-
some Future of Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIEs (Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17
/11/o9/opinion/the-worrisome-future-of-abortion-rights.html [http://perma.cc/2CWS
-NUK 7 ] ("Among the precedents cited for the 'need not facilitate' rule are those holding that
the government need not pay for abortions for women who can't afford one. But that is a far
cry from Jane Doe's situation. There was never a question of the government paying; the cost
of the abortion was borne by a private fund."); see also Garza, 874 F.3d at 753 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) ("For minors such as Jane Doe who are in U.S. Government custody, the Govern-
ment has stated that it will not provide, pay for, or otherwise facilitate the abortion but will
transfer custody of the minor to a sponsor pursuant to the regular immigration sponsor pro-
gram."). To the contrary, the government was not asked to fund the abortion (the procedure
was being paid for by a third party). See Garza, 874 F.3d at 74o (Millett, J., concurring). In
our view, that should not matter either, as an immigrant does not surrender autonomy over
her body simply by entering the United States. The state cannot force a girl to become a
mother simply because she is an immigrant.
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In this case, the government imposed a "categorical [] blockade" of Doe's con-
stitutional right when it conditioned her leaving the shelter to obtain an abortion
on a return "to the abuse from which she fled" in her home county, where she
became pregnant." This placed Doe in "constitutionally untenable" position."
Judge Millett suggested that only a "legal Houdini" could overcome the var-
ious obstacles and impositions ordered by the federal government.100 A different
analogy, that of a legal Olympic hurdler practiced in the ways of navigating the
various TRAPs specifically targeting pregnant women, comes to mind. Even for
the best-trained athlete, overcoming the seemingly endless bevy of hurdles -
only to find a moat interposed before the finish line - is seriously doubtful. That
none of the various and substantial hurdles placed in Doe's path related to her
health and well-being (or if so, only tangentially), demonstrates an even larger
systemic problem that extends well beyond Doe's specific case.' Namely, a
broader failure exists in the rule of law such that the constitutional rights of poor
pregnant women and minors are held hostage by the state. This, we argue, is not
only unconstitutional, but frankly immoral. For, even after Doe rounded the final
hurdle, attaining what should have been within her constitutional reach, the
Trump Administration threatened to seek disciplinary actions against her attor-
neys who prevailed on her behalf, which further illustrates our point.102
We present Doe's case to offer additional context and texture to Bridges's
strong claim, even though her strong and moderate claims often blur. Does
Bridges's strong claim make room for when women actually obtain abortions
even if they endure enormous hardships along the path to exercising their repro-
ductive right(s) ? Possibly. But, Bridges is not clear on that point. In the instance




101. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016) (striking down two
Texas laws imposing undue burdens on pregnant women who seek abortions in that state,
stating that the "upshot is that this record evidence, along with the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, provides ample support for the District Court's conclusion that '[m]any of the
building standards mandated by the act and its implementing rules have such a tangential
relationship to patient safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary"' (internal
citation omitted)).
102. Brief in Opposition of Rochelle Garza, as Guardian Ad Litem to Unaccompanied Minor J.D.,
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state and federal legal strictures in order to actualize a fundamental constitu-
tional right. This process lasted more than seven weeks even while, in the end,
Doe was able to terminate her pregnancy.
In reality, the very potent example that we provide in Garza v. Hargan may
equally suit Bridges's moderate claim framework. Or, the fact that Borrego never
received the healthcare she sought, but instead was sent to jail, could fit Bridges's
strong claim framework. Even though Doe did receive the abortion she sought,
many poor women are unable to exercise their reproductive rights. Their cases
do not stir national attention; their plights are invisible and unanswered.
Predictably, some scholars will not accept the "strong claim" that economi-
cally vulnerable women possess no privacy rights. To them, Doe's abortion is evi-
dence that privacy rights do exist and can be accessed by any woman or minor
who avails herself to informed consent requirements. Yet, cases of women like
Borrego,os Regina McKnight,104 Bei Bei Shuai,os Rennie Gibbs,106 and so many
others illustrate the violence of the state's power if left unconstrained by strong
privacy rights. The abrogation of privacy rights can result in formal punishment,
the deprivation of liberty, the removal of children from the home, and financial
punishment.
Thus, one soft critique of Bridges's book may be that its strong and moderate
claims are not sufficiently distinguished. That is, at the root of state and federal
obstruction of reproductive rights are blurred rather than fixed lines. Bridges
seems to acknowledge this fact, as she argues that in both cases, poor women are
"completely exposed to state power."' In the end, whether one accepts the
103. Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 66 (describing Borrego's arrest during her gynecological appoint-
ment for fake documentation of legal status).
104. McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008) (overturning McKnight's conviction for hom-
icide by child abuse after she gave birth to a stillborn fetus and admitted to using cocaine
during pregnancy).
105. Ed Pilkington, Indiana Prosecuting Chinese Woman for Suicide Attempt that Killed Her
Foetus, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/o
/indiana-prosecuting-chinese-woman-suicide-foetus [http://perma.cc/57R2-WSX5] (de-
tailing the criminal charges against Shuai following an attempted suicide that may have
caused the death of her fetus).
1o6. Court To Hear Case of Woman Accused in Stillbirth, JACKSON FREE PREss (Apr. 1, 2013,
10:39 AM), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2013/apr/ol/court-hear-case-woman
-accused-stillbirth [http://perma.cc/NC38-RKP4] (discussing the pending prosecutions of
Rennie Gibbs and Nina Buckwalter for the deaths of their stillborn babies); see Brief of the
Appellant at 36, Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-M-819-SCT (Miss. Nov. 12, 2010) ("Under the stat-
utory interpretation advanced by the prosecution, Ms. Gibbs faces life in prison because of
her combined status as a pregnant woman and drug user."); see also MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
19(1)(B) (West 2017).
107. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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strong or moderate claim may be immaterial, because in either instance, the state
has compromised its legitimacy by imposing insurmountably severe and bur-
densome constraints on reproductive health and rights such that it would require
the artistry of a magician or pertinacity of an elite athlete to overcome.
In addition, because "privacy rights are imagined to generate value," and not
simply for the individual, but also to the communities to which they belong,108
denial of rights exposes vulnerable people (and communities) to dignitary
harms. The next Section discusses why privacy rights are necessary to assure
widespread human dignity and how they have been denied to poor women, par-
ticularly poor women of color.
B. The Value of Privacy Rights
Initially, readers of Bridges's book may be doubtful about the strength of her
thesis that poor mothers have been deprived of privacy rights, as it may seem
indefensible to them. After all, despite their poverty, constitutional protections
rooted in the Fourth,0 9 Fifth,11 0 and Fourteenth Amendments1 1 still apply to
indigent women. Although the word "privacy" is not found in the text of the
Constitution, Justice Blackmun explained in Roe v. Wade that "the Court has rec-
ognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."1 12 The Court has opined that pri-
vacy is a woman's fundamental right, specifically referencing the medical harms,
distress to their lives, psychological stress, economic instability, and stigma
states would impose on women by infringing upon their privacy right to make
io8. Id. at 11 (citing DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008)).
iog. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) (finding that state hospital
staff were government actors subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment in a case
where indigent pregnant women were unconstitutionally searched at a medical university for
law enforcement purposes).
11o. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Millett, J., concurring).
iii. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-6oo (1977) (establishing that privacy rights encompass
two distinct spheres: an individual's interest in independent decision-making and an interest
in avoiding or refusing disclosure of intimate information, including medical records); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwanted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.").
112. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. Justice Blackmun traced the right in a line of cases going back to the
nineteenth-century case Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
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reproductive health decisions." Furthermore, federal laws such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996114-not mentioned in
Bridges's book- explicitly guarantee patient privacy. And while the state may as-
sert "important interests in safeguarding health,"'" as Bridges acknowledges,116
the threshold for infringing on a right to privacy is high - at least in theory.
Bridges's emphasis on the fragility of poor mothers' privacy rights is partic-
ularly striking considering the strong presumption regarding the family right to
privacy, which is rooted in instrumental,"' pragmatic," and noninstrumental
justifications.1 9 Bridges describes each of these justifications in turn, buttressing
her argument with landmark Supreme Court opinions striking down state laws
that banned the use of contraceptives,12 0 required children to attend public
school,12 1 and proscribed schools from teaching foreign languages.12 2 Yet, from
our perspective, family privacy could also be extended to cases like Loving v. Vir-
ginia,123 where the Supreme Court struck down antimiscegenation laws limiting
who people could marry and include in their family.
As Bridges observes, there is strong justification to limit the state from con-
straining individual freedom within families. A state that would standardize chil-
dren or families "is absolutely terrifying."2 4 She explains:
113. As Justice Blackmun explained, "[t]his right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy:" Id. at
153.
114. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 et seq. (2012).
115. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
uS. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 118-22. But Bridges also explains that poor families "are simply more
visible to the state." She writes, "[T] he difference between wealthier and poor parents is that,
as a direct consequence of their poverty, the lives of the poor are subject to more observation
by third parties -parties who may have a legal duty to report possible child maltreatment to
authorities. Because of dependence on public aid and public resources ... poor families are
more likely to come to the attention of child welfare agencies." Id. at 122.
117. Id. at 102-103.
n8. Id. at 1o5.
ig. Id. at 105-107.
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning a Connecticut statute criminalizing
the dispensation of contraception to married couples).
121. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down an Oregon law mandating that
children attend public schools).
122. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling a Nebraska law that banned foreign language
instruction unconstitutional).
123. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
124. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 104.
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In essence, the state would become omnipresent: It would be in its sub-
jects' values, beliefs, opinions, worldviews, politics, and so forth. If the
state is present in its subjects' minds and hearts - indeed, if the state
forms its subjects' minds and hearts - the state, in very important ways,
would form the institutions in civil society that individuals create: family,
school, religion, the press, the market, and so on. And if the state forms
the institutions in civil society, it would approximate absolute power.
This is totalitarianism.12 5
Thus, one concern expressed by Bridges is the need to ward off a dystopic
future wherein an authoritarian government "standardizes" its citizenry, includ-
ing children, mothers, and fathers.
While most privacy scholarship concentrates on what a government must
not prohibit because of the "fundamentality" of the right or conduct the law pro-
scribes, some scholars take a different view. Jed Rubenfeld argues:
The question, for example, of whether the state should be permitted to
compel an individual to have a child- with all the pervasive, far-reach-
ing, lifelong consequences that child-bearing ordinarily entails - need
not be the same as the question of whether abortion or even child-bear-
ing itself is a "fundamental" act within some normative framework.126
Rubenfeld explains that ultimately the "distinguishing feature of the laws
struck down by the privacy cases has been their profound capacity to direct and
to occupy individuals' lives through their affirmative consequences," and that it
is " [t] his affirmative power in the law, lying just below its interdictive surface"
that "must be privacy's focal point."12 7 Another way of understanding the point
made by Rubenfeld is to imagine the state visiting the families of each newborn
to declare what future it will or will not have; some may be removed to different
cities, states, and climates to better acclimate to the state's choices-winter ath-
letes sent to cold climates; future doctors and scientists carted off to boarding
schools heralded for intellectual rigor; soon-to-be maids, sanitation workers,
and low-income earners relegated to blighted communities with underachieving
schools. This nightmarish notion is as offensive as the state determining a preg-
nant woman or minor's future.
Yet, this scholarly disagreement shows that what is at stake is not simply a
matter of what an overly intrusive state may prohibit, but what this type of state
125- Id.
126. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739-40 (1989).
127. Id. at 740.
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may obligate its citizens to do.128 Viewed through this lens, in the case of abor-
tion, the state forces women into the future it prefers by absolutely or effectively
stripping their privacy. As we have argued elsewhere, "When the state makes this
decision for a woman, against her will, it inscribes her to a fate of its choosing,
which for all purposes is to serve as its designated womb or incubator."129 Forc-
ing anyone into labor or condition against his or her will for the benefit of others
is by definition understood as slavery. Coercing women into subsequent state
reliance on welfare and social service programs does not mitigate this fact or
make it any less problematic.
As noted, Bridges suggests that a strong family privacy right "is a bulwark
against this type of totalitarianism."s0 According to Bridges, however, the prob-
lem is that reproductive and family privacy rights often yield little value in the
lives of poor women. Bridges stresses that the "family is not beyond regula-
tion,""' "parental liberty is not absolute,"132 and family privacy rights "[yIield
[n]o [v]alue" in the lives of poor women.' If it is true that all mothers suffer
infringements on privacy, what makes the matter worse for poor women? The
difference may be that for poor women, it is not an infringement, but rather two
distinct privations in operation: dispossession-as in the sense that these are
rights never had (or intended to be had) by poor women (Margaret Garner's
128. Id. at 739 ("But the fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found in the supposed
fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes.").
129. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman's Private Choice, 95 TEX. L. REv.
1189, 1232 (2017).
130. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 104.
131. Id. at 114 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 499 (1977)).
132. Id. at 114.
133. Id. at 107.
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tragic life and Black women's plights during chattel slavery more generally ex-
emplify this)134 and perdition- as in the sense of punishing women simply be-
cause they are poor (eugenic sterilizations offer a stunning illustration)."'
Bridges rightfully acknowledges "the struggle to reconcile" the narrative of
equal rights and presumptive privacy rights against a backdrop of "poor moth-
ers . . . not enjoy[ing] privacy rights in any real sense of the word."1 3 6 She clev-
erly shows that although we may think the Constitution protects privacy rights,
the courts and legislatures' unwillingness to acknowledge the lived experiences
of poor women further disenfranchises them of these rights. This matters be-
cause the state intervenes in the very areas of poor women's lives that the Su-
preme Court has held should be safe from intrusion.
Bridges evokes the scholarship of the school of legal realism, including Karl
Llewellyn,"' Jeremy Waldron,' 8 and Anita Allen."' In particular, Bridges relies
on Llewellyn's notion of "paper rights," that is, rights without substantive ex-
pression in people's lived lives. Building on Llewelyn, Bridges explains, "[o]ne
knows that the [] [rights] exist not by looking to whether a constitution, statute,
or court opinion has formally provided it, but rather by looking to whether the
purported rightsbearer enjoys a remedy when the ostensible right is violated."14 0
Llewellyn was skeptical about formal rules, noting that they are often unequally
134. The case of the pregnant runaway slave, Garner, further illustrates not only what it means to
be deprived of reproductive privacy, such as to be rendered a breeder and supply mechanism
for the production of others' property, but also to be legally and politically silenced in the
process. Garner escaped slavery in Kentucky, fleeing to Cincinnati, Ohio over the frozen Ohio
River. In a desperate attempt to resist her return and that of her children, she began killing
them, including the ones presumed to be the biological offspring of her owner. At trial, Garner
was indicted not for the killing of her daughter, but for the destruction of her owner's prop-
erty. Not even her daughter could be legally said to belong to her in any real sense of the word.
Garner's life is fictionalized in the Pulitzer-Prize-winning novel Beloved by Toni Morrison. See,
e.g., STEVEN WEISENBURGER, MODERN MEDEA: A FAMILY STORY OF SLAVERY AND CHILD-MUR-
DER FROM THE OLD SOUTH (1998); Julius Yanuck, The Garner Fugitive Slave Case, 40 MIss.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 47 (1953); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842)
(invalidating a Pennsylvania law that prohibited Blacks from being removed from the state
into slavery).
135. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
136. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 65.
137. E.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism -Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931).
138. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 6 (1993).
139. Anita L. Allen, Legal Rightsfor Poor Blacks, in THE UNDERCLASS QUESTION 117, 117-39 (Bill E.
Lawson ed., 1992); Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126
HARv. L. REV. F 241 (2013).
140. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 19.
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applied, and thus lack coherence. The ultimate strength of the rights depends on
the subjective leanings of judges.141 Bridges explains that we are "trained to un-
derstand that rights may be infringed when the government has good reason for
doing so .... When the right is not fundamental, the government's reason for
infringing it need not be as urgent."142
Bridges highlights how courts repeatedly find poor women's reproductive
rights to "not be so urgent," using the vocabulary of morality in their justifica-
tion.143 Bridges points to how the moral constructions of indigent motherhood
and race have allowed the state to convince courts to let it override poor women's
privacy rights. She explains that "[r] ace - that social force that both obviously
and obliquely shapes the nation- must be considered in any analysis of how the
working mother became moral and the nonworking mother became im-
moral."144
Despite the formal constitutional and statutory protection of privacy, Bridges
convincingly shows how these rights ultimately fail to protect poor women.
Thus, the test for existence of privacy rights is not the existence of formal rules,
but rather whether the rights may be utilized and exercised without arbitrary
encumbrances imposed by the state. In the next Section, we explore further why
this might be, focusing on how moral norms have penetrated and shaped the
law. As Bridges articulates, there is no way to understand how courts and legis-
latures have stripped poor mothers of their rights without understanding these
underlying morality debates.145
C. The State as a Negative Messenger Against the Poor
Society crystallizes the image of the morally corrupted, libidinous poor
woman of color in the so-called welfare queen. The figure of the welfare queen,
which Ronald Reagan birthed into popular imagination, remains "the apotheo-
sis of immorality" in the American ethos.146 We have all seen versions of her,
141. See Llewellyn, supra note 137, at 1238-39, 1242-43.
142. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 15.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 51; see also id. ("When cultural discourses attached a badge of immorality to mothers
who worked outside of the home, the fact that many of those mothers were black -indeed,
the fact that most black mothers worked outside the home -validated this judgment.").
145. Id. at 37-39.
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popularized by news media in the image of a Black woman, surrounded by mul-
tiple unkempt children, in homes ravaged by despair. Headlines from the 198os,
for example, suggested that taxpayers' hard-earned wages and savings rendered
profits for these women.147 And, with her endless bounty of children, state re-
sources continuously funneled in to provide for their care. Photographers cap-
ture the image of a seemingly hopeless woman, and society is to measure
whether spending their resources on situations such as hers is also a hopeless
affair. Nothing about this situation resembles an aristocracy.
Reagan's "welfare queen" became a convenient stereotype to scapegoat and
stereotype all poor Black women.148 As Kaaryn Gustafson explains, "This image
of the lazy African-American woman who refuses to get a job and keeps having
She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting veterans'
benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands.. .. And she's collecting Social
Security on her cards. She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps and she is collecting
welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over $150,ooo.
'Welfare Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 15, 1976), http://www
.nytimes.com/1976/02/15/archives/welfare-queen-becomes-issue-in-reagan-campaign
-hitting-a-nerve-now.html [http://perma.cc/RLZ3-8NNJ]. To place in context President
Reagan's erroneous claim, and the anger it inspired against Black women receiving welfare
benefits, $15o,ooo in 1976 was worth $660,849.82 inJune 2017, according to the government's
consumer price index as of August 6, 2017-an unfathomable sum to earn from government
benefits. Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, Bu1RAu LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi
-bin/cpicalc.pl?costl=15oooo&yearl=1976o1&year2=207o6 [http://perma.cc/4KKCW
-GTNU]. Nor is it lost on us that President Reagan launched his campaign with a first stop
at the local fair in Neshoba County, Mississippi - an event attended by possibly ten thousand
people. Of all the places to launch his campaign and float the welfare queen myth, then-can-
didate Reagan chose a county most known for the brutal killings of three young civil rights
activists in 1964: Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney. See, e.g., Bob
Herbert, Righting Reagan's Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/11/13/opinion/l3herbert.html [http://perma.cc/CK2F-ZXVA] ("The murders were
among the most notorious in American history. They constituted Neshoba County's primary
claim to fame when Reagan won the Republican Party's nomination for president in 1980.
The case was still a festering sore at that time. Some of the conspirators were still being pro-
tected by the local community.").
147. Josh Barbanel, New York City's Economy Booms, and the Poor Begin To Profit, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/o5/16/nyregion/new-york-city-s-economy
-booms-and-the-poor-begin-to-profit.html [http://perma.cc/64MC-4CUC] ("Some have
looked to the decline in the welfare rolls, as well as a decline in the number of homeless people
seeking emergency housing, as evidence that some poor people are benefiting.").
148. John Blake, Return of the "Welfare Queen," CNN (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:32 PM), http://edition
.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/weflare-queen/index.html [http://perma.cc/U7ZR-JDFT].
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kids is pretty enduring. It's always been a good way to distract the public from
any meaningful conversations about poverty and inequality."149
Bridges refers to the welfare queen trope and its many variations as the moral
construction of poverty. And this moral construction of poverty directly and in-
directly shapes the development of privacy norms for poor women of color. To
Bridges, the trope of the welfare queen embodies many of the characteristics that
help this country to imagine poor Black women as immoral citizens, subjected
to a barrage of insults and demeaning characterizations that suggest laziness, in-
eptness, disregard for offspring, sexual promiscuity, incompetence with financial
resources, and disrespect for self and society. 0̀ Author bell hooks speaks to this
perception in killing rage, where she writes, " [W] ithin the sphere of white su-
premacist assault on black womanhood nothing was as hurtful quite as 'deeply
and keenly as the taunt of immorality; the jest and sneer with which our women
are spoken of, and the utter incapacity or refusal to believe there are among us
mothers, wives, and [young women] who have attained a true, noble, and refin-
ing womanhood."s1
Clearly, such vilification allows society to attribute poverty to the poor's own
behavior in order to limit their citizenship.15 2 ignored, then, is how the devalu-
ation of Black women's bodies and rights has historically been "central" to build-
ing American capital, reflected through the economic exploitation of slavery,5
149. Ally Boguhn, Why Everything We're Led To Believe About People on Welfare Is Based on Lies,
EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Aug. 23, 2015), http://everydayfeminism.com/2o15/o8/welfare-is-not
-living-large [http://perma.cc/U7GG-CVU6]; see also ICAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING
WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011).
150. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 107.
151. BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 77 (1995) (quoting an 1887 editorial by Ida B.
Wells).
152. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 55; see also HOOKS, supra note 151, at 77 ("As early as 1887 black woman
activist Ida B. Wells wrote an article titled 'Our Women' which appeared in the newspaper
New York Freeman, in which she emphasized the way white supremacist degradation of black
womanhood served to undermine anti-racist struggle.... Wells declared: 'Among the many
things that have transpired to dishearten the Negroes in their effort to attain a level in the
status of civilized races, has been the wholesale contemptuous defamation of [Black]
women."').
153. SVEN BECKERT & SETH ROCicMAN, SLAVERY'S CAPITALISM: A NEw HISTORY OF AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (2016) ("Scholars of slavery have gone further to recognize the tech-
nologies of capitalism as indispensable to transforming human beings into commodi-
ties. . . . Scholars of Atlantic slavery . .. have recognized women's reproductive labor as the
fundamental mechanism of wealth creation for American slaveholders, who appropriated
generations of black children for the perpetuation of generations of white wealth.").
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Jim Crow,154 and more contemporaneously, persistent wage disparities.15 5 As a
more recent matter, Bridges explains that the state shows its disregard for poor
mothers' citizenship, and the rights such citizenship condones, by imposing it-
self in their homes as a condition of receiving government aid.156 Claims that
poor women's lives are rendered public by their need for state assistance and thus
are subject to some level of state surveillance and control are not new.1 7 Neither
is the notion that an individual sheds or surrenders some level of privacy after
she enters a governmental system -be it the criminal justice system or systems
of social services.1ss
In other words, when poor women demand freedom and equality, society
hands them back an improvement on their condition, like welfare, but not the
freedom, equality, or privacy they seek. King famously wrote that desegregated
housing and education brought Blacks a sense of achievement, "but it brought
154. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 99-100 (1977) (reflecting on
the low wages Black women received and the blowback and retaliation they experienced when
complaining to the National Recovery Administration during the 1930s and noting that
"[d] uring NRA's short life hundreds of complaints charging racial discrimination were filed
with the agency. Retaliation against those who complained was widespread. A typical case
was that of 200 women factory workers in Arkansas who were summarily dismissed for 'in-
efficiency' after one of them complained to Washington that their wage was $6.16 per week
compared to the $12.00 minimum set by the code").
155. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 110 (2d ed. 2000) ("Since the 1970s, U.S. Black women have been
unevenly incorporated into schools, jobs, neighborhoods, and other U.S. social institutions
that historically have excluded [them]. As a result, African-American women have become
more class stratified than at any period in the past."); Editorial, Even College Doesn't Bridge
the Racial Income Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol7/o9
/20/opinion/college-racial-income-gap.html [http://perma.cc/AE45-JK9Q] (focusing on
women and noting that " [p]ay gaps between white and black workers have grown since 1979,
even after controlling for education, experience and location, according to research by the
Economic Policy Institute. In fact, racial pay gaps have expanded the most for college gradu-
ates, which makes it seem clear that discrimination is a leading cause").
156. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at So.
157. See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2002);
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 177-78 (1995); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK
BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 3-4 (1997) [hereinafter ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY]; Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2196-97 (1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor
Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1995); Aus-
tin Sarat, " . . The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare
Poor, 2YALEJ. L. & HUMAN. 343, 344-45 (1990).
158. See Roberts, supra note 34.
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to the whites a sense of completion."5 9 Textual privacy and equality rights, like
welfare, seem to offer legislatures and courts this sense of completion, which
may keep them from further protecting the rights of poor women of color. In-
deed, the Court problematically declares these women to be the arbiters of their
own fates, rather than the subjects of laws and social mores that traditionally
disenfranchised them. 160
Yet, according to Bridges, the state is complicit in-if not a chief messenger
of-instigating, shaping, wielding, and propagating the negative messages de-
scribed above about poor women. States adopt the moral construction of moth-
erhood to render poor women of color blameworthy for their poverty, and, con-
sequently, in need of intervention. For example, Senator Patrick Moynihan, in
the infamous Moynihan Report delivered to President Johnson, used moral ar-
guments about the impoverished to "notoriously theorize [] problematic black
motherhood"161 as a "tangle of pathology."162 This consistent trope - the root of
poor Black mothers' pathology is their immoral reproduction in absence of mar-
riage and parenting outside of marriage, if they ever were married-offers a
wholly reductive framing of race and the family structure in the United States. 163
It ignores inconvenient historical truths, including that Black women were le-
gally denied the right to marry and possession of their own bodies, let alone a
legal claim to be connected to any others.164 To the extent that Black women
159. KING, supra note 62, at 6.
16o. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (" [R]egardless of whether the freedom of
a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the pe-
riphery of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail
herself of the full range of protected choices.").
161. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 52.
162. Id. (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, U.S.
DEP'T LAB. passim (1965), http://liberalarts.utexas.edu/coretexts/-files/resources/texts/1965
%2oMoynihan%2oReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/FT2A-PPRN]).
163. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 155, at 53 (explaining that the definitions of family "advanced by
elite groups in the United States uniformly work to the detriment of African-American
women" because "[s] ituated in the center of family values debates is an imagined traditional
family ideal,' and noting that this "family ideal" is formed through "a combination of marital
and blood ties,' which is heterosexual and racially homogenous, and where the children are
all biological offspring).
164. The architectures of slavery and Jim Crow both created stratified family structures, see, e.g.,
id. at 49 (discussing the informal kin networks that enslaved Blacks were forced to create due
to being separated at various points for the economic benefit of others, and explaining that
" [Blacks] had great difficulty maintaining families and family privacy in public spheres that
granted them no citizenship rights"), and dispossessed slaves of their bodies, see, e.g.,
State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 264 (1829) (explaining that while a slave's general owner
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could and did marry, those important relationships were persistently vulnerable
to the auction block. 165
The state's moral construction of poverty is perhaps best exemplified by the
evolution of social welfare programs over the course of the twentieth century.
For example, Black women were actually excluded from social welfare programs
years ago. These were programs designed to benefit white women who were
considered innocent of their poverty. 166 However, marriage still mattered (it
conveyed a message of being morally upstanding), and thus unmarried or di-
vorced poor white women were often excluded from such programs, despite
their destitution.1 67 Even so, as Bridges points out, when these circumstances
befell white women, it could be described as a problem of patriarchy- white
women's "failure to abide by the sex-gender system's conventions governing
marriage and the traditional two-parent family." 168 Bridges quotes Lisa Crooms
for the claim that white women's "anti-patriarchal conduct rendered them mor-
ally responsible for their poverty and justified the government's refusal to pro-
vide them with assistance.16 9
According to Bridges, single parenting and divorce in the Black community
are "understood as something bigger than a problem of patriarchy."1 7 0 It is a
problem of immorality. In other words, Black mothers are not only morally re-
sponsible for their destitution, but their lives were also "generative" of most of
the "social ills that plagued black people in the United States."1 7 1
Finally, there is the case to be made against the Supreme Court. The Court
has perpetuated inequality in privacy rights through its willingness to validate
the government's rationale for violating poor women's privacy rights. For exam-
ple, in Wyman v. James, the Court held that New York's home visitation program,
a condition of receiving Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), did
is not liable for battery against the slave, a stranger who has hired the slave temporarily may
be liable for "cruel and unreasonable battery" that devalues the slave).
165. See, e.g., TERAW. HUNTER, To 'Joy MY FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK WOMEN's LVES AND LA-
BORs AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1997).
166. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 52.
167. Id. ("Prior to Black women's agitation in the 196os for access to welfare programs that bene-
fited poor mothers, being divorced, deserted, or an unwed mother served as a moral disqual-
ification from these programs.").
168. Id. (quoting Lisa A. Crooms, Don't Believe the Hype: Black Women, Patriarchy and the New Wel-





THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not violate any right guaranteed by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, be-
cause it was a "reasonable administrative tool."172 In that case, the Court noted
that "the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and that the beneficiary's
denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is withheld,
no visitation takes place.""' However, as Justice Marshall expressed in his dis-
sent, mandatory home visits are not related to "probable cause .. . to suspect
[poor women] of welfare fraud or child abuse," and when poor women refuse to
permit home visits, state benefits may be arbitrarily denied-just as the Court
ultimately affirmed in Wyman.17
According to Bridges, another way in which the Court endorses the negative
messaging curated by states about poor women is by permitting caps on AFDC
grants, such as in Dandridge v. Williams.1 7 1 In that case, the Court upheld a Mar-
yland regulation that imposed a limitation on the amount single families receiv-
ing AFDC could claim (at the time, $250 per month was an upper limit in Balti-
more).176 Poor families contended that the state's cap unconstitutionally
imposed hardship on their younger children by denying them benefits that the
Social Security Act entitled them to receive. To the contrary, the Court ruled,
"[i] t cannot be gainsaid that the effect of the Maryland maximum grant provi-
sion is to reduce the per capita benefits to the children in the largest families."1 7 7
Notwithstanding the fact that the case involved "the most basic economic needs
of impoverished human beings,"1 7  the Court upheld Maryland's regulation,
and, in doing so, "reveal [ed] an underlying faith in the belief that people are
impoverished because of their own character flaws."1 7 9
Critics may charge that Bridges's arguments are absolutist and overstated;
obviously, poor women do possess some privacy rights. Critics also may claim
that if poor women suffer breaches to their privacy, those actions can be reme-
died administratively or judicially, and thus, their dignitary harms may be recti-
fied. However, Bridges shows how legal decisions have foreclosed many paths
for poor women to vindicate their privacy rights, by either rendering them inef-
fective or legally limiting them to the point of disenfranchisement. In this regard,
the example of abortion is particularly instructive.
172. 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
173. Id. at 317-18.
174. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see also BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 187-88 (discussing Dandridge).
176. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 474.
177. Id. at 477.
178. Id. at 485.
179. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 46.
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Some might well argue that poor women's privacy rights are not paramount
when they are pregnant, because two lives matter -that of the fetus and that of
the woman- and the state's interest in protecting the former is a compelling in-
terest. Yet as the next Part will show, the state and federal government have de-
signed access to abortion in order to provide wealthy women with options while
depriving poor women of their constitutionally mandated choice. This type of
state involvement contradicts the very premises of privacy by influencing the
ability of poor women to make their own reproductive decisions. The abortion
context also reveals the state's continuing use of moral arguments to strip por-
tions of the population of privacy rights today. The moralistic thinking that
Bridges brings to our attention is slowly disenfranchising more and more
women of their rights to reproductive and family privacy.
II. THE LEGALIZATION OF THE MORAL DISREGARD FOR WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS
The balance of our Review turns to privacy and reproductive rights. In this
Part, we add further context to our reading of Bridges's insightful contemporary
narrative. The force of her important argument, we believe, centers on the state's
moral disregard for the lives of poor women of color, especially Black mothers.
That is, when Bridges articulates that poor women of color have no privacy
rights, we read and respond to this as a condemnation of the state's moral trans-
gressions and omissions. While she examines how the state constructs poor
women of color as morally problematic, we turn to examining how the state ex-
ploits such arguments.
In this regard, we point to the state's enduring disregard for Black women's
endemic poverty, unequal educational opportunities, economic immobility, per-
sistent wage gaps, and unequal treatment. The state further cemented these con-
ditions by denying them political participation, which now continues through
voter suppression and gerrymandering the districts where they live.so The
state's omissions would certainly include a failure to remedy these conditions.
Perhaps even worse are the horrific actions the government has historically sanc-
tioned against vulnerable women.
180. See BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 13, 211-22; David A. Graham, North Carolina's Deliberate
Disenfranchisement of Black Voters, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2016, 9:30 PM), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2ol6/o7/north-carolina-voting-rights-law/493649 [http://
perma.cc/7FMY-T35J]; Alex Lubben, North Carolina Gerrymandered Districts Suppressed Black
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In her chapter on reproductive privacy, Bridges shows how the Court hol-
lowed poor women's right to reproductive privacy through a number of deci-
sions in the 1970s and 8os."' In Section II.A, we build on Bridges's analysis to
show how the Court legally constrains poor women's rights, while preserving
and protecting the rights of wealthy women. Such concerns are not new, but
sadly enduring. Decisions like Buck v. Bell, in which Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes tragically upheld a Virginia eugenics law that permitted the involuntary
sterilization of men, women, boys, and girls, epitomize our concern. That is, an-
alytical arguments based on morality remain widespread and continue to con-
strain the rights of the most vulnerable. In Section II.B, we connect the Court's
decisions to historical practices, like eugenics and labor exploitation, to illustrate
that infringements on the privacy rights of poor women of color are not novel,
but rather are rooted in illegitimate state action.
Finally, in Section II.C, we show how the proliferation of TRAP laws repre-
sents a resurgence of the type of moral thinking that has historically left poor
women without adequate means to exercise their right to reproductive privacy
and freedom. We show how the state uses morality to dispossess women of their
constitutional rights and acts immorally in the process. We demonstrate how a
majority of states are systematically engaged in such work across the country
today.
A. Moral Corruption Against Women's Bodies
The present circumstances and conditions that Bridges copiously documents
were not born of thin air, but rather forged with complicity and often the direct
involvement of the state. Articulating this truth matters for many reasons, in-
cluding acknowledging where government has failed and even harmed vulnera-
ble women. This work seeks to give visibility to the experiences of poor women
and correct assumptions and misimpressions baked into law and reified in soci-
ety.182
181. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 179-205.
182. Patricia Hill Collins recounts Fannie Barrier Williams remarking, "The colored girl ... is not
known and hence not believed in; she belongs to a race that is best designated by the term
'problem, and she lives beneath the shadow of that problem which envelops and obscures
her." COLLINS, supra note 155, at 5 (citation omitted).
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Supreme Court decisions, including Maher v. Roe,"' Beal v. Doe,184 and Har-
ris v. McRae,' misguidedly suggest hat indigent women forged their social and
socioeconomic conditions completely on their own - denying that states share at
least some responsibility or complicity in their indigence.186 As our prior schol-
arship articulates, the Court consistently strikes a "blow against not only poor
women, an unprotected class, but also against poor Black and Latina women" by
reasoning that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
own creation."817 We pointed out the absurdity of the Court's claim in Maher
"that the state law denying use of Medicaid funds does not place obstacles, either
'absolute or otherwise -in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.""" In-
deed, it is a ludicrous notion that "[a]n indigent woman who desires an abortion
suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's] decision to fund child-
birth [instead of abortion]."18
Each of these cases established that the government is not required to expend
financial resources to facilitate a poor woman's termination of a pregnancy. We
argue that these cases ultimately result in making abortion rights more illusory
than real for poor women.190 Denying a woman the available means to end a
pregnancy, a medical procedure for which she has a constitutional right, does in
fact contribute to her indigence by forcing her into parenthood, which she does
183. 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
184. 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977).
185. 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
186. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 129, at 1240 (critiquing the Court's opinion inMaher
that the "denial of public funding places a woman in no different position than she would
have been if there was no Medicaid program or no public hospital"); Michele Goodwin &
Meigan Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism and Reproductive Rights, 18
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 333, 353 (2017). See also BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 185-86.
187. Goodwin & Thompson, supra note 186, at 353 (citing Harris, 448 U.S. at 316).
M88. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 129, at 1240 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
18g. Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
190. Michael J. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in Amer-
ican Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1244 (1978) (arguing that the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence "mean[s] that some indigent women, perhaps many, will be unable to have
abortions. These are the very women most likely to have unwanted pregnancies and least able
to accommodate additional children."). Furthermore, empirical studies relate a decrease in
abortions as a result of slashes to funding. According to James Trussell and his coinvestigators,
the Hyde Amendment's impacts in Ohio and Georgia were such that roughly 20% of the fe-
male Medicaid recipients who desired an abortion could not get one because of the absence of
funds. James Trussell et al., The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financing for Abortion, 12 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 120, 129 (1980).
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not want and cannot afford. More than fifty years ago, King referenced this point
in his Planned Parenthood speech, referring to it as a "cruel" condition when
children are born into homes where they are not wanted and ill afforded.19
Consider Harris v. McRae, where the Supreme Court found that "Title XIX
does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medically necessary abor-
tions for which Congress has withheld federal funding."1 92 The Court stated that
"[t] he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the
full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency."'93
Justice Stewart claimed that, although Congress subsidized necessary medical
services generally, but excluded abortions, indigent women still maintained "at
least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically neces-
sary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no
health costs at all."194 But this makes no sense, because the state does subsidize
other medically necessary services, while excluding the choice of abortion for in-
digent women.
We take the position that a state must not coerce a pregnant woman's deci-
sion whether or when to become a mother.95 These are core tenets of reproduc-
tive justice.1 96 That is, the state could decide not to fund pregnancy, labor and
191. King, supra note 2.
192. 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980).
193. Id. at 316.
194. Id. at 317.
195. We believe the state may choose to avoid paying for any medical services related to pregnancy
altogether, including childbirth and abortion. However, if the state, through its Medicaid pro-
gram, extends itself to pay for any medically necessary services related to pregnancy, it cannot
then deny services, such as abortion, based on its preference for pregnancies. In other words,
the state cannot condition its Medicaid funding on a quid pro quo, coercing a woman into the
life that it condemns her to have, especially a life that burdens her with hardship. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168-69 (laying out liberty arguments); King, supra note 2 ("For the Ne-
gro, therefore, intelligent guides of family planning are a profoundly important ingredient in
his quest for security and a decent life. . . . There is scarcely anything more tragic in human
life than a child who is not wanted. That which should be a blessing becomes a curse for
parent and child.").
196. See Loretta J. Ross, Understanding Reproductive justice, SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR RE-
PROD. HEALTH COLLECTIVE 6 (May 20o6), http://d3n8a8pro7vhnx.cloudfront.net/rrfp
/pages/33/attachments/original/1456425809/UnderstandingRJSistersong.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BV28-87UV]. Ross explains:
[Women of color] were also skeptical about the motivations of some forces in the
pro-choice movement who seemed to be more interested in population restrictions
rather than women's empowerment. They promoted dangerous contraceptives and
coercive sterilizations, and were mostly silent about the economic inequalities and
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delivery, as well as abortion. By doing so, the state would not force the hand of
pregnant women to fall into the default of motherhood. However, when the state
chooses to fund one treatment for pregnancy, namely, childbirth, and not others,
it ultimately makes the decision for what a woman's reproductive future will be.
In fact, that is the point. Anti-abortion legislation is a direct attempt to circum-
vent women from choosing (or having the option of) abortion versus pregnancy.
In other words, the underlying legislation produces anticipated results in courts
and society: unplanned pregnancies resulting in births. Surely, it cannot be un-
derstood as a choice - in any real sense of the word- when an indigent woman
is denied the ability to end her pregnancy, but is economically coerced into
months of labor that risks her physical health. If taken to its logical conclusion,
a poor pregnant woman's choice thus only practically exists when it aligns with
the state's choice regarding her pregnancy.
Thus, we find Justice Stewart's analysis anemic at best, and very likely dan-
gerous, for the proposition(s) it holds. He wrote that the Court had already ex-
plained this reasoning in Maher,"' which indeed it had ("Although government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice," he surmised, "it need not remove those not of its own creation."9 ).
Such an explanation relies on a morally driven understanding of poverty as the
result of individual choice. Bridges explains that the Court imagines poor
women as "powerful agents excising dominion over their lives. If ... they find
themselves carrying to term an unwanted pregnancy and giving birth to a child,
it is because they chose not to pull together the private resources to pay for an
power imbalances between the developed and the developing worlds that constrain
women's choices.
197. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that a state's choice to pay for nontherapeutic abortion is a policy
decision not mandated under the Equal Protection Clause).
198. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not obligate a state
participating in the Medicaid program to fund abortion services even while it pays expenses
incident to childbirth). Justice Stewart and the Court generally ignored the multitudinous
ways that the state contributed to women's second-class citizenship by denying them a range
of economic and civic participation activities. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79
(1981) ("Congress' decision to authorize the registration of only men ... does not violate the
Due Process Clause. The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but
also closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration."); Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (finding that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life" for purposes of creating different tiers of civic participation on juries); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948) (" [N]o female may be ... licensed [to bar tend] unless she be 'the
wife or daughter of the male owner' of a licensed liquor establishment.").
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abortion.""' The Court's reasoning echoes ideas that poverty is tied to poor
women's lack of sexual control and morality.20 0
Yet, Justice Stewart's opinion misses the point altogether. The state funds
expenses related to maintaining a pregnancy, childbirthing, and postnatal care
even though the government would not claim to play any role in impregnating
poor women. The Court's articulation of poor women bringing these problems onto
themselves reflects a punishing tone, where retribution and teaching women a
lesson are the answer. If carried to its full logic, poor women should not become
pregnant -and as Dorothy Roberts muses, poor Black women should not have
sex. 201
Both Congress and the Court agree that pregnancy is a condition that neces-
sitates medical services and warrants funding for the poor through the Medicaid
program under Title XIX. Yet, the statute ultimately defers the course of treat-
ment to the healthcare provider and patient, leaving an opening for the Court to
ruthlessly determine that abortions for poor women are not medically necessary,
despite the fact that pregnancy may be medically harmful to a woman -physi-
cally and psychologically. Justice Stevens's dissent in Harris presents a strong
contrast to the majority opinions. As Bridges explains, Justice Stevens "attempts
to humanize the women who stand to be maimed by the federal government's
refusal to fund even medically necessary abortions."20 2
For example, Justice Stevens points to the "record" being "replete with ex-
amples of serious physical harm" suffered by poor women denied abortions.2 03
Stevens references the affidavit of a young, married mother in her twenties, who
tells the story of having four children. However, following her third child in
1976, she developed a serious case of phlebitis, from which she continued to suf-
fer. She wrote, "[c] arrying another pregnancy to term would greatly aggravate
this condition and increase the risk of blood clots to the lung."2 04 The mother
199. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 185.
200. See supra Section I.C; see also COLLINS, supra note 155, at 81 ("A final controlling image - the
jezebel, whore, or 'hoochie'- is central in this nexus of controlling images of Black woman-
hood. Because efforts to control Black women's sexuality lie at the heart of Black women's
oppression, historical jezebels ... represent a deviant Black female sexuality."); HOOKS, supra
note 151, at 79 (speaking to the notion that "black women are somehow more inherently
treacherous, devious, lacking in morality and ethics than male counterparts [and that]
[t]hese negative stereotypes about black womanhood usually shape the way we are repre-
sented in mainstream mass media").
201. See ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 157.
202. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 82.
203. Harris, 448 U.S. at 353 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (quoting Jane Doe in Appendix at lo9-10, Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (No. 79-1268)).
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explained that she could not "afford to pay for an abortion [herself], and without
Medicaid reimbursement, [she could not] obtain a safe, legal abortion."20 5 She
concluded her affidavit by recounting her doctor's advice, "without an abortion
[she] might suffer serious and permanent health problems."20 6
Clearly, this record, as well as the other affidavits, were available to Justices
Stewart, Burger, White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Even the lower court took note
of how
[w]omen, particularly young women, suffering from diabetes are likely to
experience high risks of health damage to themselves and their fetuses; the
woman may become blind through the worsening during pregnancy of a di-
abetic retinopathy; in the case, particularly, of the juvenile diabetic, Dr. Eliot
testified there is evidence that a series of pregnancies advances the diabetes
faster; given an aggravated diabetic condition, other risks increased through
pregnancy are kidney problems, and vascular problems of the extremities.207
Given that a woman is fourteen times more likely to die from childbirth and
pregnancy than by ending that condition,208 forcing a woman to endure a con-
dition that she does not want and that could end her life is by definition cruel
and immoral. The state's claim that it is not responsible for the economic hard-
ship of poor women, and thus not answerable for their pregnancy terminations
(but willing to be on the hook for their childbirth), is a particularly perplexing
response to the plight of these women. These cases ultimately stand for the prop-
osition that poor women's lives are of little value to the state. Rereading Maher
in light of this record illumes the type of immoral and illegitimate state action
we seek to dismantle across this and other works.
Just as the state's motives for eviscerating poor women's reproductive rights
cannot be explained away by purported attempts to promote health, they cannot
be said to encourage states' fiscal responsibility. The Court is well aware that the
state cannot claim to promote or protect its financial interests by prohibiting the
funding of abortions while paying for the medical services required over the
205- Id.
2o6. Id.
207. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980). See generally Jill E. Adams &JessicaArons,A Travesty offustice: Revisiting
Harris v. McRae, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5 (2014) (arguing that Harris should be
revisited in light of developments in government-provided healthcare, due process rights, and
international human rights).
2o8. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion
and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215-16 (2012).
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course of a pregnancy, which cost far more.2 09 Moreover, these costs do not
simply end with the birth of a child. The state continues to pay for medical ser-
vices and child rearing associated with "Medicaid births" even after the child is
born through its state welfare systems.2 10
Bridges believes that the Court has struck a compromise between those who
support and those who oppose abortion: weakening poor women's right to re-
productive choice, while strengthening the right for wealthy women.2 11 Using
her strong claim, she contends that such a legal decision has disenfranchised
poor women of their abortion rights. She points out that this is not an example
of poor women exchanging rights for state assistance, because with or without
Medicaid, poor women have no access to abortion.2 12
Finally, the underlying premise of the Court's conclusion in these cases relies
on moral understandings of poverty to hide historical facts about its causes. Jus-
tice Stewart explained, "[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent
woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions,
but rather of her indigency."2 13 Yet, as other scholars have noted, states erected
the very barriers that denied poor Black women's voting and economic rights,
which in turn shackled their access to education, and hobbled their abilities and
capacities for better futures.2 14 Consider the hobbling effects of being excluded
from the democratic process - it directly impacts representation and promotion
of perspectives and values in political discourse.
Thus, the democratic process directly implicates citizenship and provides the
means for shaping better economic, educational, housing, environmental, and
healthcare opportunities. By directly orchestrating infringements on voting ac-
cess, states played an essential role in undermining the futures women could im-
agine and construct for themselves (i.e. who they could elect to local and national
209. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 453 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that " [t]he State
cannot contend that it protects its fiscal interests in not funding elective abortions when it
incurs far greater expense in paying for the more costly medical services performed in carrying
pregnancies to term").
210. Id.
211. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 186.
212. Id. at 186-87.
213. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
214. See, e.g., PAULI MURRAY, STATES' LAws ON RACE AND COLOR (1951) (describing thousands of
state laws that conscribed Blacks to second-class citizenship n the United States); Pauli Mur-
ray, The Liberation ofBlack Women, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 351-62 (Jo Freeman
ed., 1975); Raj Chetry et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New
Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 1o6 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016) (finding
that growing up in a low-income neighborhood decreases a child's potential lifetime earnings,
and negatively impacts college attendance rates).
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political office, to law enforcement positions, school boards, and other govern-
ment seats). Fannie Lou Hamer's testimonials at he 1964 Democratic National
Convention (DNC) about her attempts to vote in Mississippi - a state that now
has only one abortion clinic - and subsequent arrests should correct any misim-
pressions that states did not interfere with or help to manufacture the conditions
that shaped Black women's lives.
Hamer was arrested a number of times while attempting to vote, as were
many Black women across the South. Hamer describes how the state brutally
responded to her exercise of this fundamental right by arresting and torturing
her:
I was carried out of that cell into another cell where they had two Ne-
gro prisoners. The State Highway Patrolmen ordered the first Negro to
take the blackjack....
And I was beat by the first Negro until he was exhausted. I was hold-
ing my hands behind me at that time on my left side, because I suffered
from polio when I was six years old.
After the first Negro had beat until he was exhausted, the State High-
way Patrolman ordered the second Negro to take the blackjack.
The second Negro began to beat and I began to work my feet, and the
State Highway Patrolman ordered the first Negro who had beat to sit on
my feet -to keep me from working my feet. I began to scream and one
white man got up and began to beat me in my head and tell me to
hush.2 15
Hamer concluded, "All of this is on account of we want to register, to become
first-class citizens. "216
If anything, the Court's opinions in Maher and Harris expose glaring oblivi-
ousness and indifference to the obvious conditions of poor women's lives. At the
time of those cases, the sweat of Jim Crow lingered and affected where a woman
could work, the conditions of her work, and whether she would earn a dignified
wage.2 17 These concerns remain today.218
215. Fannie Lou Hamer, Testimony Before the Credentials Committee, Democratic National
Convention, (Aug. 22, 1964), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fannielouhamer
credentialscommittee.htm [http://perma.cc/P924-46AP].
216. Id.
217. See COLLINS, supra note 155, at 45-46; Goodwin & Thompson, supra note 186, at 353.
218. COLLINS, supra note 155, at 61-62 ("Black women who work yet remain poor form an im-
portant segment of the Black working class. Labor market trends as well as changes in federal
policies toward the poor have left this group economically marginalized.").
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B. Why We Can't ForgetJim Crow and Eugenics: Poverty and Reproductive
Rights
In Maher, Beal, and Harris, the Court refused to see the relationship between
state-manufactured conditions that denied women political access, control over
their reproductive health, protection from sexual assault in the home, economic
opportunities, and the realization of their constitutional rights. These decisions
illustrate how courts' inattention to the lived experiences of poor women can
strip them of their formal rights. As Bridges explains, the Court chose to see
these women as "powerful agents exercising dominion over their lives."2 19 The
Court repeatedly ignored its own history of failing to protect women, which di-
rectly impacted their safety, security, and livelihood.2 20 Thus, we find neither
comfort nor accuracy in the Court's rulings in these cases, because neither
women's poverty nor their legal and social statuses were forged in a vacuum.
Such willful ignorance only reproduced a long tradition of courts employing
"the moral construction of poverty"22 1 and race to ensure state control over the
bodies and lives of women of color and poor women. During the early twentieth
century, the eugenics movement served as a primary method to exert state con-
trol over women, while Jim Crow, a legal foreclosure of economic opportunity
for Black women,22 perpetuated the cycle of state control. During Jim Crow, the
state relegated Black girls to substandard segregated schools223 and denied them
219. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 185.
220. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a Virginia law that imposed nonconsensual
sterilization of indigent girls, women, and men); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924)
(upholding a New York law that barred female waitresses from working nightshifts); Bosley
v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (upholding a California statute limiting the hours of fe-
male pharmacists and nurses in hospitals, preventing them from earning higher evening
wages); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (upholding a California statute limiting
women's employment hours in hospital jobs); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (up-
holding Illinois law that denied female law school graduates the opportunity to become law-
yers).
221. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 12.
222. See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE
AND SEX IN AMERICA 256-58 (1984); Murray, The Liberation of Black Women, in WOMEN: A
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE, supra note 214, at 351-63; Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the In-
tersection ofRace and Sex: ABlack Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist The-
ory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166 (urging that " [i]f any real efforts
are to be made to free Black people of the constraints and conditions that characterize racial
subordination, then theories and strategies purporting to reflect the Black community's needs
must include an analysis of sexism and patriarchy").
223. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); CoLLINs, supra note 155, at4.
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admission to state colleges and universities.224 Black women occupied the least
desirable and some of the most health-hazardous jobs during and after Jim
Crow.225 Today the state does little to break the cycle of poverty that haunts the
children and grandchildren of Blacks who lived under decades of state-spon-
sored terror. In fact, the Court's decisions in Beal, Maher, and Harris work to
perpetuate the cycle by forcing poor women into motherhood when they would
otherwise reject it and setting them up for a lifetime of social stereotyping and
stigma as a consequence of the choices the state and Court make for them.
By further highlighting the vicious campaigns and enduring effects of these
legal choices, we add further context to Bridges's analysis of this deeply en-
grained phenomena that manifests in American jurisprudence and law more
generally.
1. Eugenics
American eugenics is traditionally framed as a story about the deprivation of
autonomy, privacy, and reproductive rights. It is also the story of debased values,
cruelty, and torture. For poor women, the narrative of oppression has a profound
and shameful historical arc rooted in reproductive privacy. Under the banner of
American eugenics, an immoral but significantly overlooked government plat-
form that dates back more than a century, dozens of states forcibly sterilized
thousands of girls, women, and men.226 The state rationalized the sterilization
224. See, e.g., Douglas Martin, Vivian Malone Jones, 63, Dies; First Black Graduate of University of
Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo5/1o/14/us/Vivian
-malone jones- 63-dies-first-black- graduate-of-university-of.html [http://perma.cc/E6VF
-USHC] (" [Vivian Malone Jones's] entrance to the university came as the civil rights struggle
raged across the South. On June 12, the day after Ms. Jones and James Hood were escorted
into the university by federalized National Guard troops, the civil rights leader Medgar Evers
was shot to death in Jackson, Miss." She was the "first black to graduate from the University
of Alabama in its 134 years of existence.").
225. See, e.g., PETERM. BIAU & OTIs DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE
241 (1967) (describing the "severe" entrenchment of racial discrimination in American em-
ployment, reporting that Blacks "suffer[] at every step in the process toward achieving occu-
pational success"); Sally Hillsman Baker & Bernard Levenson, Job Opportunity of Black and
White Working-Class Women, 22 Soc. PROBS. 510, 531-32 (1975).
226. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that "it is better for all the world,
if ... society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind"); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 15 (2014) (commenting on Buck);
HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 446 (1922)
(outlining a "Model Eugenical Sterilization Law"); PAULA. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS,
No IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 236-79 (2008) (discussing
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of indigent girls as young as nine and ten years old by using the language and
metaphor of morality: it was "weeding" out individuals perceived to be unfit for
reproduction. The state tilled women's and girls' bodies like a farmer clears the
land, removing offending species in order to avoid their reoccurrence. In this
case, snipping the fallopian tubes of little girls was taken as lightly as pruning
weeds.
For example, the Supreme Court notoriously sanctioned these practices in its
troubling 1927 decision, Buck v. Bell.227 The landmark case permitted the non-
consensual sterilization of Carrie Buck, a poor white teenager who became preg-
nant because of a rape at sixteen years old. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used
highly moralist language to validate his ruling, calling these poor women "men-
tal[ly] defective [] ," "feeble minded," and "socially inadequate."22 8
The Virginia law and similar legislation in dozens of states like it throughout
the United States terrorized and demoralized the poor, homeless, and unedu-
cated. The Court ruled, in some of the most offensive and insensitive language
in the United States Reports, that " [i] t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind."229 Holmes opined that the states' authority was broad enough to
cover "cutting the Fallopian tubes,"230 and famously declared that " [t] hree gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough."23 1 Within a short period after the case, more
than two dozen states had eugenics laws on the books.232 It is not a stretch of
imagination or definition to describe such state action as torture.
Class bias of the kind highlighted in Buck v. Bell, which upheld laws targeting
poorer women, like Carrie Buck, shows how deeply ingrained the belief that
poor women are less capable of caring for themselves and their children is in
Buck and its aftermath); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (20o6) (document-
ing the numerous ways in which scientists, doctors, and government officials have historically
colluded in exploiting African American women's bodies); Paul A. Lombardo, "The American
Breed": Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743 (2002) (docu-
menting the early economic, political, and social ties between Nazi eugenic policy and eugen-
ics in the United States).
227. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207-08.
228. Id. at 205, 207.
229. Id. at 207.
230. Id.
231. Id. Subsequently, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court
held a forced sterilization law unconstitutional.
232. COHEN, supra note 2, at 300. See also id. at 301 ("In the two-year period from 1928 to 1929,
there were 2,362 [sterilizations] - more than triple the annual rate from before the court's rul-
ing [in Buck v. Bell].").
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American society and law. Over the last century, states waged two forms of eu-
genic sterilization plans. The first wave occurred at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury in order to reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the reproductive potential of
poor white women considered socially and morally unfit and, in California, to
stifle the reproduction of Asians and Mexicans.233 The second wave of American
eugenics materialized in the latter half of the twentieth century -under a plat-
form to sterilize poor Black women who received state aid. In the South, these
practices came to be known as "Mississippi appendectomies," which papered
over the fact that invasive, unnecessary hysterectomies were cruelly performed
on poor women of color, often at teaching hospitals as "practice for medical stu-
dents."2 34 According to Roberts, these programs intended to deny Black women
procreative rights.235 Most of these girls and women were not informed of their
sterilizations and unaware of their doctors' complicit conduct with the states.
Nor did the state spare indigenous women. It is estimated that "as many as
25-50 percent of Native American women were sterilized between 1970 and
1976."1236 The sterilization of Native American women persisted into the 198os,
"with examples of young women receiving tubal ligations when they were get-
ting appendectomies."23 7 Repeatedly, the state demonstrated that poor women
and especially poor women of color did not have the type of reproductive rights
that it should respect. In fact, many states had so little respect for the reproduc-
tive rights of these women and girls that, more often than not, poor women and
girls were also not informed about heir sterilizations, leading them to misun-
derstand the nature of their inability to procreate.
Southern states are replete with examples that illustrate our concern. In
North Carolina, 26% of forced sterilizations were forced on children "under age
18" and 6o% of all sterilization victims were Black.238 We highlight two exam-
ples. Elaine Riddick, raped as a little girl, did not know until many years later
233. Lisa Ko, Unwanted Sterilization and Eugenics Programs in the United States, PBS: INDEP. LENS
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwanted-sterilization-and
-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states [http://perma.cc/WL4X-P4AL].
234. Id.
235. ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 304-08.
236. Ko, supra note 233.
237. Id.
238. Valerie Bauerlein, North Carolina To Compensate Sterilization Victims: State Sets $1o Million Pool
To Pay Subjects in Eugenics Program, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SBlooo14241278873239712o457862994322o881914 [http://perma.cc/6BFM
-HLHZ] (" [A]bout 2,000 of the 7,6oo who were sterilized were under age 18.").
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that the state of North Carolina sterilized her at age 14.239 Similarly in 1974, sis-
ters Mary Alice and Minnie Relf were sterilized at ages 14 and 12 in Alabama.
Years later, a lawsuit filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center on behalf of the
Relf sisters revealed that federally funded programs sterilized oo,ooo to
150,000 people each year.2 4 0 Clearly, some of those sterilizations may have been
voluntary, but the majority were likely performed under coercive means. More
recently, the state of California coercively sterilized dozens of women in its pris-
ons - in violation of the law - and only ceased doing so after the governor issued
a ban on such practices.24
Bridges describes reproductive privacy as a tool that was developed "to en-
force government abstention and to enable individuals to enjoy procreative lib-
erty."242 Yet, she conjectures that "if we examine the experience of poor women,"
we will see that the tool is either broken or absent from the toolbox.2 43 It is hard
to argue against her view in light of this history.
The cases presented above illustrate immoral state action. They epitomize
the very nature of illegitimate state rule of law by carving out and enforcing dis-
criminatory treatment against a discrete class of people, namely poor women and
girls. Importantly, Buck v. Bell and its enduring legacy show how the Court has
failed vulnerable poor women when they needed it most. By doing so, the Court
became complicit in the demeaning of poor women's reproductive rights. Sadly,
it continues to do so. It is not surprising that judges, who earn their living ap-
plying precedent, continue to fail to see how their refusal to acknowledge the
complex relationship between poor women and the state limits these women's
reproductive rights and privacy. Furthermore, as we will show below, the state's
refusal to see how its decisions disenfranchise poor women of reproductive
rights perpetuates state-sanctioned second-class economic citizenship.
239. Id.; David Zucchino, Sterilized by North Carolina, She Felt Raped Once More, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://articles.1atimes.com/2012/jan/25/nation/la-na-forced-sterilization
-20120126 [http://perma.cc/7BPR-3UCM].
240. Sterilization Abuse, S. PovERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case
-docket/relf-v-weinberger [http://perma.cc/RL7M-WWP71.
241. Hunter Schwarz, Following Reports of Forced Sterilization of Female Prison Inmates, California
Passes Ban, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat
/wp/2014/09/26/following-reports-of-forced-steflization-of-femae-prison-inmates
-california-passes-ban [http://perma.cc/66R6-WU5M].




PREGNANCY, POVERTY, AND THE STATE
2. The Relationship Between Economic and Work Exploitation and
Reproductive Privacy
If, as both King and Bridges recognize, women of color's lack of reproductive
privacy is a byproduct of their poverty, then it is necessary to recognize state
complicity in manufacturing that poverty. Throughout the twentieth century,
poor women generally had few economic opportunities, driven in part by state
policies limiting all women's job opportunities2 44 and the state-sanctioned re-
gime of Jim Crow, which allowed the machineries of slavery to persist long after
Blacks in the south gained freedom.24 5 Despite stereotypes that characterize poor
Black mothers as lazy and unemployed ("welfare queens"), Black women labor
across many spheres. However, for many, job options continue to be limited and
low-wage. The employment options open to poor women are characterized by
job instability and poor working conditions. Furthermore, some of these labor
conditions experienced by the poor are among the worst in the labor market:
" [s]ome of the dirtiest jobs in [manufacturing] industries were offered to Afri-
can-American women."246 These jobs included labor in the toxic cotton mills
where arsenic is used and as waste gatherers.24 7
We emphasize this socio-legal history because the Court largely excludes it
from its analysis. Even most scholarship on reproductive rights bypasses this
244. For example, in 1873 the Supreme Court upheld a state law that barred female law graduates
from becoming lawyers. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). In his concurrence Justice
Bradley argued that " [t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life," insisting that instead
household harmony and women's identities should belong to their families and that anything
contrary to this "is repugnant." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). State courts reached similar
conclusions about the capacities of women. E.g., In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 244 (1875) ("So
we find no statutory authority for the admission of females to the bar of any court of this state.
And, with all the respect and sympathy for this lady which all men owe to all good women,
we cannot regret that we do not. We cannot but think the common law wise in excluding
women from the profession of the law."). State and federal courts upheld a panoply of eco-
nomically discriminatory laws and practices targeted at women. Most of these laws impacted
low-income workers, denying them the right to wait tables at night, Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292 (1924), wear pants to work, Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (D.
Mo. 1979), continue employment after marriage, Cooper v. Doyal, 205 So. 2d 59 (La. Ct. App.
1967) (upholding an employment contract provision that forced airline stewardesses to resign
upon marriage), writ refused, 206 So. 2d 97 (La. 1968), tend bar, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948), or even obtain drivers licenses in their own names, Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.
Supp. 217 (D. Ala. 1971).
245. See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS (2010).
246. COLLINS, supra note 155, at 57; see also Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Racial Ethnic Women'sLabor: The
Intersection ofRace, Gender and Class Oppression, 17 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 86, 96 (1985).
247. COLLINS, supra note 155, at 57; Glenn, supra note 246, at 96.
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analysis in favor of more traditional arguments that speak only to reproductive
privacy or autonomy. Yet we believe contextualizing the broader experiences of
poor women's lives, just as Justice Blackmun did in Roe v. Wade, confers dignity
on poor women and better illustrates their lives and concerns, especially as a
connection exists between wealth and reproductive health access.
Perhaps Justices Stewart and Powell were not interested in the relationship
between state policies limiting employment opportunity for poor women and
access to abortion in Maher, Beal, and Harris. Their opinions implied that
women created their own poverty and, therefore, brought the problem of moth-
erhood onto themselves.24 8 The state bore responsibility only to make mothers
of these women, not to allow them to resituate and restore their lives. The for-
mer, a punishment, and the latter an undeserved prize.
By ignoring the lived life experiences of indigent women and girls, Justices
Stewart and Powell normalized in legal doctrine stereotypes about indigence and
motherhood. The Court contributed then to what we understand a good or bad
mother to be. Yet, such willful ignorance and indifference was not uniform
among the Court. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Beal warned that the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold a Pennsylvania law barring poor women
from receiving elective abortions through Medicaid could "only result .. . in
forcing penniless pregnant women to have children they would not have borne
if the State had not weighted the scales to make their choice to have abortions
substantially more onerous."249 justice Brennan admonished the Court for mak-
ing a "mockery" of Medicaid's mandate to "provide 'care and services ... in a
manner consistent with ... the best interests of the recipients."'2 50
The collateral consequences of this jurisprudence impact the lives of moth-
ers, their children, and the broader community. We are not surprised that Justice
Marshall, who knew the stigma and shame poor Black mothers, children, and
families encountered all too well, could already observe the effects of the Court's
decisions in 1977. He predicted that the Court's insensitivity would foist on
women economic hardships that could not be overcome.2 51 Moreover, he was
well aware that when families of color are economically deprived and disadvan-
taged, the state morphs its thinking about them. In other words, the state shifts
its thinking from regarding welfare recipients as poor to declaring them negli-
gent parents.
248. See supra notes 183-194 and accompanying text.
249. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1970)).
251. Id. at 456-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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For Justice Marshall, the connection between the Court's decisions to limit
family planning coverage through Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) (formerly AFDC) would leave
[m] any thousands of unwanted minority and mixed-race children ... in
foster homes, orphanages, and "reform" schools. Many children of the
poor, sadly, will attend second-rate segregated schools. And opposition
remains strong against increasing Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren benefits for impoverished mothers and children, so that there is lit-
tle chance for the children to grow up in a decent environment.2 52
Such prescient observations about how the denial of reproductive health
choices would result in unwanted pregnancies and childbirths now manifest in
pervasive foster care. The denial of abortion alone does not explain the system's
growth. However, the chokehold of poverty is a profound and key factor. Legal
scholars offer copious evidence to buttress Justice Marshall's unnerving predic-
tions. Research conducted by Mark Courtney and fellow colleagues at the Uni-
versity of Chicago show the cyclical effects of foster care institutionalization. The
researchers followed more than six hundred young men and women2 53 who
"aged out" of Midwestern foster care systems in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
The researchers relate that at ages twenty-three and twenty-four, in comparison
to their peers, former foster care youth are more likely to be convicted of a crime,
institutionalized, homeless, and/or pregnant.
Convicted of a crime: 23% of young men had been convicted of a crime,
and 42% had been arrested.254
252. Id. (citations omitted).
253. Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth:
Conditions of Youth Preparing To Leave State Care, CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILD. (2004),
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/ChapinHallDocument 8.pdf [http://perma
.cc/P7X9-F8JR]. Study demographics included:
[an] almost even[] split between male and female youth, and just fewer than 70
percent identified themselves as belonging to a racial minority group. Most youth
came from single-parent families and the birth mother was the most common pri-
mary caregiver in their families of origin. Over 70 percent of the youth reported
that their primary caregiver(s) experienced one or more problems that might have
compromised their parenting, most commonly alcohol abuse, drug abuse, inade-
quate parenting skills, spousal abuse, and/or having a criminal record.
Id. at 2.
254. Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth:
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* Homeless: Almost 25% had been homeless since exiting foster care.25 5
* Pregnant: More than 65% of young women had been pregnant since
leaving foster care.2 5 6
* Uneducated: Only 6% had a 2- or 4-year degree.2 57
* Unemployed: Almost 52% of those currently not incarcerated were em-
ployed.2 58
The cause of this is not simply one federal or state policy. Rather, it is a matter
of what King would refer to as unjust laws operating within a morally corrupt
system that deems poverty-indeed the poor-to be damaged and morally
blighted.2 59
To these women, the morally blighted and damned "bad mothers,"26 0 Society
offers what Justice Marshall referred to as ethically bankrupt social policies. 261
These polices included banning poor women's access to state-funded abor-
tion,262 withholding access to contraceptive care by preventing abortion provid-
ers (often the only service providers to more than half of poor women) from
2631h fie
participating in Medicaid networks, waging the failed drug war primarily
within Black and Latino communities (resulting in widespread devastation to
those communities),264 crippling social service programs, and stigmatizing poor
255. Id. at lo.
256. Id. at 49.
257. Id. at 22.
258. Id. at 27.
259. King, supra note 2.
26o. LINDA C. FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOTHERS: AMERICAN LAW AND THE RISKS TO CHILDREN'S
HEALTH 3 (2017) (pointing out that " [n]early every day brings a news story- in a major news-
paper or on the Internet- suggesting that mothers have fallen short in their obligation to
protect their children's health and well-being").
261. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 456 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal, 432 U.S. 438; see also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 311 (1980) ("Title XIX does not obligate a participating State to pay for those med-
ically necessary abortions for which Congress has withheld federal funding. . . .").
263. Stevenson et al., supra note 23, at 853 ("The exclusion of Planned Parenthood affiliates from a
state-funded replacement for aMedicaid fee-for-service program in Texas was associated with
adverse changes in the provision of contraception."); Netburn, supra note 23 ("The state of
Texas' sustained campaign against Planned Parenthood and other family planning clinics af-
filiated with abortion providers appears to have led to an increase in births among low-income
women who lost access to affordable and effective birth control . . . .").
264. E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 16 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [http://perma.cc/7N9D-6XYS] (reporting that "more than
half of prisoners serving sentences of more than a year in federal facilities were convicted of
drug offenses"); Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Annual
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mothers who might wish to stay at home with their children, while lauding
wealthy women if they do so.2 6 5 These types of coercive conditions and economic
exploitations were not limited to poor Black women's experiences.266
The vicious cycle of poverty, supported by state economic and reproductive
policies that influenced whether they could vote, attend school, or live in unseg-
regated conditions, shows the state's direct and aggressive role in shaping the
conditions of poor Black and Latina women's lives.
C. Reproductive Health, Privacy, and Unjust Laws
In the preceding Sections, we have shown how society's distrust of poor
women, the central theme of Bridges's project, has historically manifested in
court rulings and discriminatory medical practice like eugenics. Such distrust
has long wreaked havoc on the lives of poor women through the law, long after
Roe v. Wade guaranteed their right to privacy. This Section contends that the
same arguments regarding the immorality of poverty are not only relevant to the
programs discussed by Bridges, including Medicaid abortion funding and TANF
family caps but also serve as a rallying call in response to TRAP legislation
around the country.
Bridges, recognizing the power of unjust laws, explains that poor women
could enjoy reproductive privacy in two ways: first, when they live in states that
Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-general-eric-holder-delivers
-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations [http://perma.cc/2VX5-DPH3]) (ask-
ing whether the war on drugs has "been truly effective"); Barack Obama, Remarks at the
NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press-office/2015/o7/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference [http://perma.cc/L6A7
-DVES]) (noting that Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately incarcerated in the United
States); Jenifer Warren, One in 31: The Long Reach ofAmerican Corrections, PEW CTR. ON STs.
5 (Mar. 2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2o09/03/02/PSPPlin31_report
FINAL _WEB_326o9.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6SQ-A4X8] (emphasizing the high incarcer-
ation rate in the United States and the disproportionate imprisonment of Black and Hispanic
Americans); see also Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD.
3 (May 2011), http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl
-9.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VBV-LR7K] (comparing incarceration rates across the globe).
265. See generally BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 52.
266. Thomas A. Arcury et al., Work and Health Among Latina Mothers in Farmworker Families, 57 J.
OccUPATIONAL & ENvTL. MED. 292, 292 (2015) (citing A.J. Marin et al., Evidence of Organiza-
tional Injustice in Poultry Processing Plants: Possible Effects on Occupational Health and Safety
Among Latino Workers in North Carolina, 52 AM. J. IND. MED. 37 (2009)) (presenting research
specifically relating to Latina mothers in farm-working families that found "[a] ssociations of
abusive supervision with health indicators among manufacturing workers are stronger for
women than for men").
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do not cap TANF and structure their Medicaid programs to provide therapeutic
and non-therapeutic abortions and underwrite the costs of childbirth; or, sec-
ond, when there is no TANF program and the state "refuses to fund nonthera-
peutic abortions, therapeutic abortions, and the costs attendant o childbirth."2 67
Both of these scenarios remove state bias, expressed monetarily, from the repro-
ductive choice of women. Bridges emphasizes that although her research is an-
thropologically rooted, she is concerned about law and reproductive privacy as a
legal tool "to enforce government abstention and to enable individuals to enjoy
procreative liberty."268 To the point, she, like us, is troubled by government abuse
of power such that it would "compel" a woman "to act in alignment" with its
desires.26 9 in other words, the state advances "just laws" when its citizens share
the same benefits and detriments without regard for race and class.
Although Bridges roots the fragility of poor women's privacy rights in the
underdeveloped academic justification of these rights and moral construct of
poverty, we would argue even more emphatically that it is our courts and legis-
latures that have allowed our social notions to undermine legal rights. The over-
lapping effects of sexism, racism, and paternalism -believing that women and
children benefit from overly invasive state actions and restrictions in the lives of
pregnant women - severely undermine the dignity and privacy of poor women.
These policies invariably impact women's health and freedom to live their full
lives and reach their desired potential.
Furthermore, as discussed above, states -responsible for serving the inter-
ests and rights of their constituency- continue to ignore the realities of poor
women, insisting that the very rights that they render meaningless and hollow
will protect vulnerable communities. Reproductive rights are a strong example.
The scale and scope of recent efforts to abolish reproductive privacy rights is
concerted and alarming. These laws include: legislation requiring that doctors
acquire medically unnecessary hospital-admitting privileges;27 0 banning the use
267. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 191.
268. Id. at 179.
269. Id.
270. H.B. 57, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013); S.B. 2305, 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (to
be codified as N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-02.1-04(1) (2013)); H.B. 2, 83d Leg. Sess., 2d Spec. Sess.
(Tex. 2013); S.B. 206, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2013).
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of telemedicine;271 barring insurance providers from covering abortions;2 72 pro-
hibiting abortions after six273 and twelve weeks;274 proscribing abortion cover-
age to state employees;2 75 requiring the governor's approval of Medicaid funded
abortions;2 76 mandated ultrasounds ;277 and waiting periods.2 78
According to a 2015 article published by the Guttmacher Institute, "[tihe
goal of antiabortion advocates is to make abortion impossible to obtain by lay-
ering multiple restrictions, even though many claim that their motivation is only
to protect women's health."2 79 Thus, between 2011-2013, legislatures enacted
more regulations to constrain abortion access than in the prior decade.280 in an
ACLU report, thirty-five states proposed over three hundred abortion rights re-
strictions in 2013 alone.28 1 This derailment of women's privacy rights was well-
coordinated and well-funded. Seventy of these restrictions were enacted in
twenty-two states282 -the second highest number of restrictions passed in one
legislative session. In fact, " [n]o year from 1985 through 2010 saw more than 40
271. H.B. 57, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013); S.B. 371, ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S.B. 90, 2013 Reg.
Sess. (La. 2013); S.B. 2795, 128th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); H.B. 400, 9 7th Gen. Assemb.,
ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013); S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.B. 2, 83rd Leg.
Sess., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
272. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.542(2) (West Supp. 2014); H.B. iloo. 89 th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (to be codified as ARx. CODE. ANN. § 23-79-156 (2013)); H.B. 818, 19 7 th
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 1900, 2013 Reconvened. Sess. (Va. 2013) (to be codified as VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3451 (2013)).
273. N.D. CENT. CODEANN. §§ 14-02.1-05.1 to -05.2 (West 2017), invalidated by MKB Mgmt. Corp.
v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015). In MKB Mgmt., experts testified that a fetal heart
beat is detectable at six weeks. Id. at 771.
274. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1301 to -1307 (2013).
275. S.B. 98, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013); H.B. 730, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. (N.C.
2013).
276. S.F. 446, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2013).
277. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (West 2017).
278. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A- 5 6 (2014).
279. Andrea Rowan, Prosecuting Women for Self-Inducing Abortion: Counterproductive and Lacking
Compassion, 18 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv. 70, 70 (2015).
28o. Laura Bassett, More Abortion Laws Enacted in Past Three Years than in Entire Previous Decade,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o14/o1/o3
/states-abortion-laws-n 4536752.html_[http://perma.cc/MUH5-AILKJ].
281. States Where They Think We're Stupid: Abortion Access Under Attack in 2013, ACLU (Aug.
5, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/maps/states-where-they-think-were-stupid-abortion-access
-under-attack-2013 [http://perma.cc/V6NS-3JBN].
282. See Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Provid-
ers - and the Women They Serve - in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 9, 9 (2014).
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new abortion restrictions; however, every year since 2011 has topped that num-
ber."2 83
Legal scholars who find consolation in the 2016 Whole Woman's Health v. Hel-
lerstedt284 decision should not celebrate too soon, notwithstanding the import of
that decision. In that case, the Court struck down two Texas laws that imposed
onerous burdens on poor women's access to abortion services: a surgical center
requirement and the legislature's admitting privileges rule. Justice Breyer wrote
that " [t] he record also contains evidence indicating that abortions taking place
in an abortion facility are safe -indeed, safer than numerous procedures that
take place outside hospitals and to which Texas does not apply its surgical-center
requirements."285 To emphasize this point, the Court noted that a colonoscopy,
which takes place outside of a surgical center and hospital setting, "has a mor-
tality rate lo times higher than an abortion," and liposuction (also performed
outside of a surgical center and hospital) has a mortality rate "28 times higher
than the mortality rate for abortion."28 6 Justice Breyer concluded that:
[t] he upshot ... [of this] record evidence, along with the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, provides ample support for the District Court's
conclusion that "[m] any of the building standards mandated by the act
and its implementing rules have such a tangential relationship to patient
safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary."287
In fact, the World Health Organization has reported that a legal abortion in the
United States is as safe as a penicillin shot;288 as we know, a penicillin shot does
not require an ambulatory surgical center to facilitate that procedure.
Turning to amicus briefs filed in the case, Justice Breyer took special note of
the long and distinguished career and service of Dr. Lynn, a doctor at the
283. Id. (explaining that states enacted ninety-two abortion restrictions in 2011, forty-three re-
strictions in 2012, and seventy restrictions in 2013).
284. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). In that case, the Supreme Court struck down only two Texas TRAP
laws: the requirement that doctors obtain hospital admitting privileges and a mandate that
clinics adopt surgical center standards. Other Texas TRAP laws, including mandatory wait
periods, parental consent laws, and requirements that women listen to inaccurate health
scripts prior to terminating their pregnancies, remain in effect.
285. Id. at 2315.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 2316 (alteration in original) (quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673,
684 (W.D. Tex. 2014)).
288. Unsafe Abortion: Global and Regional Estimates of the Incidence of Unsafe Abortion and Associated
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McAllen Clinic in Texas. Lynn performed over 15,000 deliveries, but could not -
in nearly forty years of practice - obtain "admitting privileges at any of the seven
hospitals within 30 miles of his clinic."289 In ruling that the admitting privileges
mandate "does not serve any relevant credentialing function,"290 Breyer refer-
enced a letter from a hospital that rejected Lynn's petition for admitting privi-
leges. In pertinent part, the letter noted that the denial of such privileges was
"not based on clinical competence considerations."291
Despite the apparent victory that Whole Woman's Health represents, it does
not relate to - in deeper and more meaningful ways - poor women's access to
abortion. Nor does it address the numerous other TRAP laws in place in states
like Texas or elsewhere, where only one abortion clinic exists in the entire state.
As discussed earlier, Doe's odyssey to end her pregnancy in Texas lasted over
seven weeks. Eventually, she prevailed, but only after securing the legal help of
the ACLU, the nation's largest civil liberties organization.
We are concerned about states' illegitimate and immoral attempts to sup-
press reproductive rights of vulnerable women. And, we are not persuaded that
Whole Woman's Health will stop states bent on denying poor women reproduc-
tive health rights. That is, the inordinate number of TRAP laws untouched by
Whole Woman's Health will continue to impose unjust limitations on women's
reproductive healthcare access. In 2016, states enacted more than sixty new abor-
tion restrictions292 and while many of these restrictions were enacted pre-Whole
Woman's Health, some critical provisions were legislated and signed into law in
the second half of 2016, after the Supreme Court's decision barring states from
unduly burdening women's reproductive privacy rights.293
In fact, during 2017, legislators in six states enacted bans on some or all abor-
tions,29 showing complete disdain for poor women's reproductive privacy
289. Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312.
290. Id. at 2313.
291. Id. (quoting Appendix, Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274)).
292. 2016 State of the States: A Pivotal Time for Reproductive Rights, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs. 5 (Jan.
2017), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/USPA
StateofStates_11.16_WebFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/U43D-LLKD].
293. For example, Ohio recently banned all abortions performed after twenty weeks, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.201 (West 2017), and a new Michigan law prevents physicians from selling
or donating fetal tissue, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 333.2690 (2017).
294. See Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends, 2017, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2018), http://www
.guttmacher.org/article/2o18/ol/policy-trends-states-2017 [http://perma.cc/43WQ-Z3F8];
Restricting Insurance Coverage ofAbortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/restricting-insurance-coverage-abortion [http://
perma.cc/D2GX-4S44] (showing that "26 states restrict abortion coverage in plans offered
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rights. In those states, wealthy women could travel elsewhere to end their preg-
nancies. Pragmatically, for poor women, this would not be an option, and their
reproductive rights would be rendered ineffective. In 2017, thirty states intro-
duced legislation that would restrict abortion in some circumstances.2 95 And
eight states have passed legislation that would prohibit dilation and evacuation
procedures, effectively banning most second-trimester abortions, although only
two such laws are in effect.2 9 6
Iowa is home to the single most intrusive law, which mandates that Medicaid
reimbursement for low-income women's medically necessary abortions be ap-
proved by the governor, even in cases of rape or endangerment of the mother's
life. 297 Not only did the law, signed by Governor Terry Branstad, take the deci-
sion about how to handle serious health issues away from women, putting them
in the hands of a "more responsible" male, it also burdens the right of poor
women, while leaving the rights of wealthy women unaffected. Elizabeth Nash
of the Guttmacher Institute thinks the law could also have a chilling effect, caus-
ing poor women to think twice about undergoing a life-saving procedure be-
cause they are worried about the giant bill if the governor does not agree with
their doctor.2 98 Iowa's law mimics and exaggerates the effects of court decisions
such as Maher and Beal, emphasizing the state's continued disregard of the lived
experiences and dignity of poor women.
In sum, forty years after Roe, twenty-four states banned abortion coverage in
health exchanges and nineteen limited coverage for state employees. 2 9 9 To state
the obvious, it is poor women who suffer from these policies and, given the cor-
relation of race and poverty in American society, it is usually women of color who
through the insurance exchanges" and "20 states restrict abortion coverage in insurance
plans for public employees").
295. Nash et al., supra note 294. Two states outlawed all abortions occurring after twenty weeks.
S.F. 471, 8 7th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311-782(1) (West
2017). Several states enacted omnibus antiabortion legislation packages. S.B. 8, 8 5th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); H.B. 1128, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017); S.B. 5, 9 9 th
Gen. Assemb., 2d. Extraordinary Sess. (Mo. 2017). Three states introduced bans on abortions
sought due to fetal genetic anomalies, other states enacted bans on abortions due to race or
gender selection, which are alleged to target women of color. Boonstra & Nash, supra note 281;
Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct.
1, 2017), http://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-race
-selection-or-genetic-anomaly [http://perma.cc/37SJ-V5NZ].
296. Nash et al., supra note 294.
297. 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 138, § 142.
298. Nora Caplan-Bricker, Poison Pen, NEw REPUBLIC (June 5, 2013), http://newrepublic.com
/article/113378/iowa-budget-would-give-governor-power-over-medicaid-abortion-benefits
[http://perma.cc/8F7A-PBS5].
299. Boonstra & Nash, supra note 282; see Restricting Insurance Coverage ofAbortion, supra note 294.
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bear the brunt of these laws. Similar to TANF funding, limitations on funding
and insurance coverage do not abridge the rights of wealthy women who can pay
out of pocket. These laws mandate that poor women, who cannot pay for the
reproductive care they desire, do not have the right to such care. Such thinking
continues a long history of using state resources to hold the poor and "immoral"
captive. Although the tactics are new, the state continues to choose those who
are fit and those who are unfit for full reproductive rights and freedom. Collec-
tively, these laws exert enormous power and control over women's reproductive
privacy and capacity to such a degree that procreative liberty simply does not
apply to them.
III. DANGEROUS TIMES: A REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH WARNING
The normalization of a culture of unjust laws and dubious enforcement of
those laws creates norms that will ultimately spill beyond racial lines. Poor
women of color bear the overwhelming brunt of the state's hostility and depri-
vations related to reproductive health (and beyond as we describe in this Re-
view). However, we predict this will not always be the case. As states enact re-
strictive abortion laws, and courts enforce them, an abusive precedent is set that
eventually may hurt all women. This Part issues our warning call.
In Letter from A Birmingham Jail, King famously wrote that "injustice any-
where is a threat to justice everywhere."00 On one hand, his point was that a
threat to the civil rights and liberties of people in one community by the govern-
ment could eventually become the problem of people elsewhere. We can call this
the canary in the coalmine theory."o1 On the other hand, King flagged a discontent
with those who would be passive to the harms which others experienced. He
wrote of being "gravely disappointed" of those more concerned about order than
justice, and frustrated by those who thought that Blacks should be more patient
and wait for their constitutional rights to be realized.302
We believe both concerns apply to the plight described by Bridges regarding
poor women's disenfranchisement of reproductive privacy protections. Bridges
contends that "poor mothers will only bear the privacy rights that wealthier peo-
ple bear when immorality is disarticulated from poverty and mothering while
poor."0 3 Simply put, poor women, especially women of color, have been hurt by
the government and denied the rights accorded others by hurdles instantiated
300. King, supra note 36.
301. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11-12 (2002).
302. King, supra note 37.
303. BRIDGES, supra note 1, at 228.
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by the State and its courts. We add that because wealthy women have enjoyed a
wide range of reproductive choices since Roe v. Wade, they have not been the
advocates for reproductive rights that poor women have needed.
Roe v. Wade provides little solace to a poor woman in Texas who wants to
end her pregnancy but lives hours from the nearest clinic equipped to legally
perform the procedure. Whole Woman's Health offers little relief to the poor
woman still burdened by state-imposed waiting periods, which in some states
exclude weekends and holidays -purportedly to protect her health and inform
her consent.
We are deeply worried about he status of reproductive healthcare rights for
poor women in the United States, especially for women of color - the population
to which Bridges rightfully devotes critical attention. Because racial disparities
infect many aspects of society (including healthcare delivery), Blacks, Latinas,
Native Americans, and Asians may be subjected to harassing, discriminatory, and
unlawful treatment triggered simply because of their racial and ethnic identi-
ties.304 In combination, the hobbling impacts of race, sex, and class bias may
render reproductive privacy rights more illusory than real for them- or, as
Bridges says in her strong claim, nonexistent.
As we argued in Part II, ineffective reproductive rights can influence many
aspects of poor women's lives, including employment opportunities, their chil-
dren's future, and their ability to break through the state-reinforced cycle of pov-
erty. In addition, we argue that reproductive privacy rights are deeply tied to
women's health rights in general.
Although the rates of maternal mortality are generally disconcerting in the
United States, they are particularly horrendous for Black women. Black women's
maternal mortality is nearly three and half times that of white women,"os and
rates are even worse in states like Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, where
few or only one abortion clinic remains.3 06 For example, one report shows that
while "Black mothers gave birth to 11.4% of babies born in Texas in 2011 and
2012 ... they accounted for 28.8% of all pregnancy related deaths."o Another
304. See, e.g., ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 157 (discussing different ways in
which racial disparities operate in society).
305. Mary Beth Flanders-Stepans, Alarming Racial Differences in Maternal Mortality, 9 J. OF PERI-
NATAL EDUC. 50, 50-51 (2000); Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (NOV. 29, 2017), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth
/maternalinfanthealth/pmss.html [http://perma.cc/7V2Z-LNR2].
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recent report observes that the maternal mortality rates in Chicksaw, Mississippi
surpasses that of Rwanda: " [i]n some rural counties and dense cities alike, the
racial disparity in maternal deaths is jaw-dropping."as In New York City, "Black
women are twelve times more likely than white women to die from pregnancy-
related causes."' Indiana, Vice President Pence's home state, has one of the
worst records of maternal mortality in the nation.1 o Sadly, the global health
goals established and adopted by the United States more than a decade ago have
not been met, even as developing nations made great strides in addressing ma-
ternal morbidity."'
Courts have yet to protect women from some states' assaultive measures, like
mandating vaginal ultrasounds as a condition of receiving an abortion, requiring
pregnant women to hear the fetal heartbeat as a condition of receiving an abor-
tion, or sharing information that the procedure might cause cancer and mental
illness; many of these are based on dubious science.3 12 It is true that even if a
woman must travel to another state, it is much less of a cost than being forced
into a life she does not want with a child she does not wish to have. The gravity
of the distinction is quite clear. Nevertheless, it remains a cruel and immoral im-
pingement on a right if a woman is required to leave her home state in order to
access it.
Just as we have become comfortable with the idea that poor women do not
deserve privacy rights, we also note that the normalization of medically unnec-
essary, invasive interference in poor women's reproductive lives creates cultural
norms and precedents in medicine, society, law enforcement, legislatures, and
courts that will undoubtedly spill over to all classes of women. Race privilege or
economic affluence cannot protect wealthy white women against the encroach-
ment of antiabortion laws. Even while middle-class women may be able to es-
cape some of the crueler impacts of state infringements on their reproductive
privacy, we predict they too will suffer if the onslaught on reproductive privacy
is not brought to an end.
308. MeaghanWinter, A Matter of Life & Death: Why Are Black Women in the U.S. More Likely To




311. MacDorman et al., supra note 24, at 453-54.
312. Elaine Schattner, Do Abortions Cause Breast Cancer? The Shaky Science Behind Kansas' House
Abortion Act, SLATE (May 23, 2012, 6:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/healthand
science/medical-examiner/2o12/o5/do-abortions cause breast cancer kansas-state
house abortion act invokesshaky science for political gain_.html [http://perma.cc
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This future is already upon us."' Forced cesarean sections and civil confine-
ment of pregnant women illustrate our point. Consider the case of Lisa Epsteen,
a white middle-class mother of five threatened with arrest for refusing to un-
dergo a cesarean section. Epsteen informed her doctor that she simply wanted to
wait two additional days before submitting to the operation. Her request was
met with a threatening email, sent by the chairman of the University of South
Florida's obstetrics and gynecology department. In the email, he threatened to
have law enforcement arrest her, because as he put it, "you are leaving the pro-
viders of USF/TGH no choice."314 Clearly, there were other choices, options, and
approaches to take with this pregnant mother. The doctor simply chose a cruel
and demeaning tactic, one that, if enforced, would have robbed his patient of her
dignity and autonomy.
Epsteen's case is not isolated and represents a broader and troubling public
health trend in the United States, where cesarean surgeries occur at a rate over
double what is recommended or considered safe by the World Health Organiza-
tion."'s In Melissa Ann Rowland's case, refusal to submit to a cesarean section
prompted her arrest.316 She was ultimately charged with murder in the stillbirth
of one of her fetuses.' Similar cases are documented in Washington, D.C., Illi-
nois, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and other states."' When women are
treated as medical research subjects, required to undergo procedures against
their will, then their reproductive rights have become illusory.
In perhaps the most shocking of such cases, Angela Carder was forced to
undergo a cesarean section over her dying objections. 9 In that case, she in-
313. Cf Goodwin, supra note 35 (describing modem state interventions into women's pregnan-
cies).
314. Letitia Stein, USF Obstetrician Threatens To Call Police If Patient Doesn't Report for C-Section,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/usf
-obstetrician-threatens-to-call-police-if-patient-doesnt-report-for/21o7387 [http://perma.cc
/XKCN3-PF 731-
315. Anna Almendrala, U.S. C-Section Rate Is Double What WHO Recommends, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 16, 2015, 10:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o15/o4/14/c-section-rate
-recommendation n_7058954.html [http://perma.cc/V8UD-DAYR].




318. See Goodwin, supra note 35.
319. See In reA.C., 57 3 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (holding that when a pregnant patient
is near death and her fetus is viable, the decision of what is to be done is to be decided by the
patient, unless the patient is incompetent).
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formed doctors that she wanted to receive chemotherapy and did not want a ce-
sarean section. Her doctors successfully sought a court order, which granted
them the authority to open her womb and remove her fetus. The fetus died in
two hours and Ms. Carder died soon thereafter, never receiving the medical
treatment she requested. When women are punished for choosing vaginal deliv-
eries, the most natural way for a woman to give birth, then reproductive rights
are in serious jeopardy for all women.
Recent cases in Wisconsin involving the civil punishment of pregnant
women are also troubling. Wisconsin has revisited the Unborn Child Protection
Act,320 which largely targeted poor Black mothers in the 1990s for drug use dur-
ing pregnancy. However, the most recent civil confinements have not concerned
Black women. Instead, Alicia Beltran was forced into civil confinement for more
than seventy days in 2013 for the supposed protection of her fetus, even while no
medical threat to her fetus existed.321
Beltran's prenatal visit, where she disclosed prior dependence on prescription
medications, triggered medical providers to disclose private patient information
to law enforcement and state officials. Beltran was arrested, and although no
lawyer was provided for her, the state granted representation for her fetus.322
Soon thereafter, Tamara Loertscher, was forced into solitary confinement by the
state, also for the purpose of protecting her fetus.323 According to Lynn Paltrow,
the Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women, while the
exact number of women in Wisconsin who have been civilly confined under its
laws is unknown, since 20o6 at least 470 women are reported to have broken its
Unborn Child Protection Act.324
Our warning call is not to minimize the important fact that poor women of
color stand on the frontlines of legislative assaults on reproductive privacy. We
recognize those harsh realities. But by understanding the broader impacts of
320. 19 9 5 WISc. ACT 292 (1997). The constitutionality of this act is currently being challenged in
the courts. See Andrew Chung, Supreme CourtLifisBan on Wisconsin's 'Cocaine Mom'Law Dur-
ing Appeal, REUTERS (July 7, 2017, 5:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court
-cocaine/supreme-court-lifts-block-on-wisconsin-cocaine-mom-law-during-appeal-idUSK
BN19S2YX [http://perma.cc/BSB6-HHRZ].
321. Daniella Silva, Shackled and Pregnant: Wis. Case Challenges 'Fetal Protection' Law, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 24, 2013, 9:32 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2o13/1o/24/21117142-shaclded
-and-pregnant-wis-case-challenges-fetal-protection-law [http://perma.cc/8594-RVHR].
322. Id. (reporting that "what started as a routine visit ended with Beltran eventually handcuffed
and shackled in government custody").
323. Nina Liss-Schultrz, AJudge Struck Down the "Cocaine Mom" Law That Put Pregnant Women in
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these privacy encroachments, all women will recognize their shared interests in
agitating for change. Middle-class white women must come to see a shared des-
tiny with poor women of color. Failure to comprehend this reality will doom
them too.
CONCLUSION
Sadly, in this Review, we report that for poor women, reproductive privacy,
including access to the family planning that King called "urgent" and "necessary"
has become more illusory than real. That is, women's abilities to act autono-
mously of the state in control of their bodies continues to be determined by their
race and class, and threatened by assaultive reproductive health laws, coercive
judicial opinions, and sometimes indifferent medical providers. The effect has
been to neuter the meanings of reproductive privacy, procreative liberty, and
choice.
The impacts are cruel and immoral in the lives of poor women of color. This
is the point of The Poverty of Privacy Rights. Bridges urgently intervenes in the
scholarly literature on motherhood and state power325 to argue that to be poor
in the United States and dependent on governmental assistance is to experience
intrusions and trampling on constitutional rights unrivaled by all others in soci-
ety.
325. See LINDA BURNHAM, WORKING HARD, STAYING POOR: WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE WAKE
or WELFARE "REFORM" (2000); GUSTAFSON, supra note 149; Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads &
Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. JUST. 233 (2014); Ca-
mille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race Theory Alternatives to
ExistingAnti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 257 (2016).
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